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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

DANIEL CHERNOBIEFF,
Petitioner,
vs
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

_________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Ada Co. No. CV01-17-22652

VERIFIED PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF

The petitioner alleges:
1.

Place of detention if in custody: Not in custody

2.

Name and location of court which imposed judgment/sentence:
Magistrate Court for the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
County of Ada

3.

The case number and the offense or offenses for which sentence
was imposed:
(a)
(b)

Case Number: CR-MD-2013-13271
Offense Convicted: Driving Under the Influence-excessive

Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief- I

4.

5.

The date upon which sentence was imposed and the terms of
sentence:
(a)

Date of sentence: June 4, 2014

(b)

Terms of sentence: Withheld judgment: 365 days in jail with
355 days suspended with options, one year supervised
probation, $2,000 fine with $1,000 suspended, court costs of
$197; restitution of $240, driving privileges suspended for one
year

Check whether a finding of guilty was made after a plea:
(a)
(b)

6.

Of guilty. X (conditional guilty plea)
Of not guilty.

Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction or the imposition
of sentence?
Yes. Initially was Supreme Court docket number 43112 and an
opinion was issued by the Court of Appeals, upon granting of petition
for review by Supreme Court docket number 44259 was assigned.
Supreme Court published opinion State v. Chernobieff, 161 Idaho 537
(2016). Remittitur issued January 23, 2017.

7.

Prior to this motion have you filed with respect to this conviction:
(a)

Any petitions in state or federal courts for habeas corpus? No.

(b)

Any other petitions, motions or application in this or any
other court? No.

(c)

If you answered "yes" to (a) or (b) state with respect to
each petition, motion or application the nature of each motion
or application and the name and location of the court in which
each was filed.

Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief-2

8.

CLAIM

PETITIONER RECEIVED COGNIZABLE INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL REGARDING THE MOTION TO
SUPPRESS THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW
INTRODUCTION TO THE CLAIM
In the underlying criminal case, Petitioner Daniel Chernobieff (hereinafter
Petitioner) was charged with misdemeanor DUI. He was represented by retained
counsel Jacob D. Deaton (hereinafter defense counsel), who has since unrelatedly
resigned from the Idaho State Bar in lieu of disciplinary proceedings.
Defense counsel brought a motion in the magistrate court to suppress the
results of a warrantless blood draw which the on-call

prosecutor had based on

exigent circumstances after he was unable to reach the on-call magistrate to obtain
a search warrant.
The on-call prosecutor testified at the motion to suppress hearing that he
later learned the reason he could not reach the on-call magistrate was because the
ringer had been turned off on the magistrate's cell phone.

Incredibly, defense

counsel objected to this evidence and successfully moved to strike it. Not only did
he strike the evidence showing that there was not good cause for the unavailability
of an on-call magistrate, defense counsel himself did not call the on-call magistrate
as a witness, nor present any other evidence showing the absence of good cause, or
even argue that the lack of a back-up system in Ada County showed a lack of good
cause.
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The magistrate denied the motion to suppress and Petitioner entered a
conditional guilty plea and the matter was eventually appealed all the way up to
the Idaho Supreme Court. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, holding, relevant
here,

while it was the state's burden to prove good cause for the magistrate's

unavailability, it had to presume the trial court ruled correctly because there was
no such evidence in the record because defense counsel objected and had it stricken.
Petitioner asserts this is cognizable ineffective assistance of counsel, to wit,
that the motion to suppress would have been granted and/or its denial reversed but
for defense counsel's action/inaction since the evidence stricken established there
was not good cause for the magistrate's unavailability.

Counsel's objection and

striking of the evidence were based on ignorance of the law because he argued the
ability to obtain a search warrant is not a relevant factor for exigent circumstances,
which is directly contrary to the controlling law, NcNeely v. Missouri, 569 U.S. 141,
133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013).
Finally, had the results of the blood test been suppressed, Petitioner would
not have pled guilty to DUI-excessive or DUI, nor, according to the prosecutor,
would he have been prosecuted for DUI at all.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The facts and procedure important to this petition are for the most part well
established and are succinctly set forth in the Supreme Court's opinion, which is
again, State v. Chernobieff, 166 Idaho 537 (2016), and is attached hereto as Exhibit
A for this Court's convenience:

Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief-4

On September 11, 2013, at around 11:00 p.m., Idaho State Police
Corporal Matthew Sly responded to a request for assistance from
another officer who had pulled Chernobieff over in a traffic stop.
Upon arrival, Corporal Sly noticed the odor of an alcoholic beverage,
that Chernobieffs eyes were "glassy and bloodshot," and that his
speech was "slow and lethargic." Corporal Sly also noticed that
Chernobieff was agitated and appeared to have difficulty answering
questions.
Based upon these observations, Corporal Sly asked
Chernobieff to perform standard field sobriety tests, but Chernobieff
refused. Consequently, Corporal Sly placed Chernobieff under arrest
for suspicion of driving under the influence ("DUI") and placed him in
the patrol car. In the car, Corporal Sly played the audio version of the
administrative license suspension form for Chernobieff and began the
fifteen minute wait period required for a breath test. However,
Chernobieff refused the breath test. Corporal Sly then contacted the
on-call prosecutor for assistance in obtaining a warrant for a blood
sample. The prosecutor asked Corporal Sly to transport Chernobieff
to the jail, where a conference call would be set up with the on-call
magistrate to obtain a search warrant.
The prosecutor then
unsuccessfully attempted to contact the magistrate.
Over
approximately ten minutes, the prosecutor attempted to call the
magistrate between three and five times and left one or two voicemail
messages. Unable to reach the magistrate to obtain a warrant, the
prosecutor directed Corporal Sly to perform a blood draw due to
exigent circumstances. Corporal Sly contacted the phlebotomist to
perform a blood draw, and the test results indicated Chernobieffs
blood alcohol content was 0.226.
The State charged Chernobieff with DUI with an excessive blood
alcohol content. Chernobieff filed a motion to suppress, asserting that
the warrantless blood draw violated his rights under both the United
States and Idaho Constitutions.
The magistrate court denied
Chernobieffs motion, finding that the exigent circumstances exception
to the warrant requirement applied under the specific facts of this
case.
Subsequently, Chernobieff filed a conditional guilty plea,
reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
Chernobieff timely appealed to the district court, which affirmed the
magistrate court's decision. Chernobieff again appealed and the
Idaho Courts of Appeals affirmed. Chernobieff sought, and the
Supreme Court granted, review.

Id, at p. 539.
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LEGAL STANDARDS REGARDING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL AND WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
A.

Ineffective assistance of counsel
The law applicable to this case is also well established. A defendant

in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The
Sixth Amendment has been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states. See Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal defendant's
right to counsel. Idaho Const. art. I, § 13; LC. § 19-852.
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based
upon the state or federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar
standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

In order to

prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's
performance was deficient m that it fell below standards of reasonable
professional performance; and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced
the defendant.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. The prejudice

prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a different
result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted
properly. Id.
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B.

Exigent circumstances exception to the 4th Amendment warrant

requirement
As to the substance of the issue, this case concerned the question of
whether exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless blood draw.
The Supreme Court in Chernobieff explained the standards as follows:
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of every citizen to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const.
amend IV. "Requiring that a person submit to a blood alcohol
test is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the
Idaho Constitution." State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418, 337
P.3d 575, 577 (2014).
Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
To
overcome this presumption of unreasonableness, the
search must fall within a well-recognized exception to the
warrant requirement. Exigency and consent are two
well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.

Id. at 419, 337 P.3d at 578. (internal citations omitted)
"Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is
reasonable must be determined case by case based on the
totality of the circumstances." Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S.
141, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1563, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013). "[E]xigent
circumstances justifying a warrantless blood sample may arise
in the regular course of law enforcement due to delays from the
warrant application process." Id. However, "while the natural
dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of
exigency in a specific case ... it does not do so categorically."
Id. "In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers
can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be
drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the
search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so." Id.
at 1561.
Id., p. 540.
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THE HEARING AND RULINGS
In this case, Petitioner refused to perform field sobriety tests or take
a breathalyzer test.

The police officer was well aware that he needed a

warrant for a blood draw given the then state of the law (post Missouri v.

McNeely, 459 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013)).
As established at the hearing on the motion to suppress from the
testimony of the Idaho State Police Officer (Corporal Matthew Sly), from the
scene (in Meridian), he called the on-call Ada County prosecutor who said
the officer should call him when he got to the jail and he would call the on call magistrate judge to obtain a warrant. (Tr. p. 15, Suppression hearing
transcript attached hereto as Exhibit B.) When the officer arrived at the
jail he called the prosecutor, who told him to stay on the line while he tried
to call the on-call magistrate, but he got no answer. (Id.) The prosecutor
told the officer to give him five or ten minutes and he would call the officer
back. (Id. p. 16.) The prosecutor called the officer back, but had not obtained
a warrant and told the officer to go ahead and order a blood draw due to
exigent circumstances. (Id. p. 16.)
The on-call prosecutor from that night (Scott Bandy) testified at the
hearing. His testimony was substantially the same as the police officer's
about attempting to contact the on-call magistrate. The prosecutor testified
that he called the on-call magistrate, Judge Mike Oths, at the judge's
personal cell phone number, which is the judge's preferred method of
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contact.

(Tr. p. 23.) The prosecutor called that number and received no

response and called it again to check he had dialed right. (Tr. p. 23.) He
had, and he left a voicemail message requesting a return call and that it was
for a blood draw search warrant. (R. p. 23.) All told, the prosecutor called a
certain three times and perhaps five, and left a voicemail, maybe two. (Tr.
p. 23-24.)

The on-call prosecutor then testified that the next day he conferred
with the magistrate and found that the ringer was off on his cell phone. (Tr.
p. 24.) Defense counsel objected and moved to strike this evidence, and the
court sustained the objection. (Id.)
The on-duty prosecutor then testified:
At that point I informed Trooper Sly that we had made
substantial efforts to try and contact the on-call magistrate and
that based on our inability to get in touch with him, that we
would then default back to exigent circumstances that would
provide an exception to the warrant requirement due to the
unavailability of securing a warrant in a timely fashion.
Tr. p. 24, Ins. 17-24.
The magistrate denied the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court
opinion described the grounds, as well as the grounds of the district court
sitting as an appellate court, as follows:
The district court affirmed the denial of Chernobieffs motion to
suppress the blood test results, finding that the magistrate's
determination of exigent circumstances was supported by the
record. The magistrate noted delays in the proceedings leading
up to the blood draw, including the delay resulting from the
inability of the prosecutor to contact the on-call magistrate in
order to obtain a warrant and the fact that the level of alcohol
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in the blood dissipates over time. Although the record does not
contain a specific timeline, it took some time for Corporal Sly to
arrive on the scene, to play the administrative license
suspension audio, to begin the 15 minute waiting period for a
breath test, to transport Chernobieff to jail, and to contact the
phlebotomist. The magistrate noted that some delay resulted
from Chernobieff's refusal to perform field sobriety tests. The
magistrate specifically mentioned that the prosecutor made a
good-faith effort to reach a judge for a warrant, that the on-call
judge could not be contacted in a number of attempts, that
there was no back-up process to get a different judge, and that
the prosecutor "appears to have done all he could to get a
judge's permission to take the blood in a timely fashion." The
district court, while upholding the magistrate's findings,
observed that the inability to reach the on-call judge is "a
problem one might expect more in a small county rather than in
Ada County" and that "this breakdown has been exposed and
can be addressed by a redundancy system, at least where
multiple judges are available."
Chernobieff, 161 at p. 540 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court held as follows:
The proper analysis for determining if exigent circumstances
exist is whether, under the totality of the circumstances of the
case, the needs of law enforcement were sufficiently compelling
that it was reasonable to conduct the blood draw without a
warrant. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1558. In its appellate review,
the district court considered a number of factors, including the
lateness of the hour, the various delays that occurred in the
proceedings from the time Corporal Sly was called, and the
dissipation in the level of blood alcohol with the passage of
time. The district court specifically pointed to the prosecutor's
attempt to obtain a warrant through the on-call magistrate who
could not be reached. The district court also made reference to
the delay resulting from Chernobieff's refusal to perform field
sobriety tests, but in doing so the court erred. Any delay
caused by Chernobieff's exercise of his Constitutional rights
may not be considered.
The court concluded that the
magistrate considered the totality of circumstances and that
the magistrate's findings were supported by substantial
evidence. We concur. Even excluding the delay related to the
field sobriety tests, there was substantial evidence to support
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the magistrate's findings. Therefore, we find that the district
court did not err in affirming the denial of the motion to
suppress the results of the blood draw.

Id. p. 161, Idaho at 541.
Also relevant here, the district court in its opinion on appeal stated as
follows beginning with the magistrate's comments while denying the motion
to suppress:
. . . "At 11:00 p.m. there is only one on-call judge, and even if
[the Ada County on-call prosecutor] were to call another judge
and get that judge up, that judge isn't really situated to hear
probable cause because the one digital recorder we have is with
the on-call judge. So it's kind of a pickle when you can't reach
the on-call judge." This is a problem one might expect more in a
small county rather than in Ada County.
In any event, the determination of exigent circumstances made
by the magistrate is supported by the record. However, and
this is a very weighty however, this breakdown has been
exposed and can be addressed by a redundancy system, at least
where multiple judges are available. The logic of the old adage
that every dog gets one bite is applicable in this realm. It is
very likely that a failure in the judicial process in the future
will not weigh as an exigency unless that failure is tied to a
failure of equipment or some other factor not controllable in the
court system itself.
Opinion

on appeal, p. 6-7 (Clerk's Record 43112, p. 121-122.) (Attached

hereto as Exhibit C.)
In response, and most important to Petitioner's claim, the Supreme
Court stated:
The district court's observation regarding the inability to
contact the on-call magistrate, particularly in Ada County
where there are a number of magistrate judges, does raise some
concern. The State has an obligation to provide a functional
and reliable system for obtaining warrants in circumstances
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like these, both during regular office hours and through the
night and on weekends. When an on-call magistrate is unable
to be reached by law enforcement, the State has the burden of
showing why that is the case and that good cause exists for the
unavailability. Here, the State sought to present evidence as to
the reason for the magistrate's unavailability, but defense
counsel objected and the evidence was stricken from the record.
With no such evidence in the record, the Court presumes that
the trial court ruled correctly. Poole v. Davis, 153 Idaho 604,
607, 288 P.3d 821, 824 (2012).

Id. at p. 541.

OBJECTING TO AND STRIKING THE REASON THE
MAGISTRATE COULD NOT BE REACHED WAS
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUSNEL
A) Introduction
The last quoted paragraph of the Supreme Court's opinion succinctly
explains the basis for this claim: by objecting and striking the evidence from
the record, defense counsel removed the burden from the state of showing
why the magistrate was unavailable and that good cause exists for that
unavailability.

By preventing the state from presenting any evidence,

defense counsel prevented the Supreme Court (all courts really) from
considering it and, without any evidence, the Supreme Court had to simply
presume the trial court ruled correctly. Had that evidence, which does not
show good cause, been able to be considered by the Supreme Court
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(again, all courts really), the order denying the motion to suppress would
have been reversed (or granted in the first instance).l
Without the blood results Petitioner certainly would not have pled
guilty to DUI-excessive, and he would not have pled guilty to DUI either.
What's more, according to the state, he would not have even been
prosecuted.
B) The objection and motion to

strike constituted deficient

performance and Petitioner suffered actual prejudice
Again for this Court's convenience, the Supreme Court explained:
The State has an obligation to provide a functional and reliable
system for obtaining warrants in circumstances like these, both
during regular office hours and through the night and on
weekends. When an on-call magistrate is unable to be reached
by law enforcement, the State has the burden of showing why
that is the case and that good ca use exists for the
unavailability.
Chernobieff, p. 541 (emphasis added).

The standard is good cause for the unavailability of an on-call
magistrate ..2_

Petitioner asserts that had defense counsel not objected to

(and then had struck) the testimony that the ringer was turned off on the
on-call magistrate's cell phone, that good cause for the unavailability of a

1 Alternatively, as an included and not separately set forth claim, defense
counsel did not attempt to establish the absence of good cause by, for
example, calling the on-call magistrate as a witness or even by arguing the
lack of a back-up judge. These failures were also due to his ignorance of the
law, discussed further below.

2 Not incidentally, the Supreme Court stated "an" on-call magistrate, not
"the" on-call magistrate, more on this below.
Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief-13

judge to issue a warrant would not have been shown. The ringer being off on
a cell phone cannot constitute good cause because that would for all practice
purposes create a negligence exception to the warrant requirement. Being
bad at obtaining a warrant cannot become a reason a warrant is not
required.
Unsurprisingly, Petitioner has found no case anywhere with a similar
reason for the judge's unavailability.

Good cause would much more likely

be an issue if it involved, for instance as stated by the district court in this
case,

a failure of equipment or some other factor not controllable in the

court system itself.

In other words, something like phone lines or a cell

tower being down in a storm presumably would be considered good cause in
the exigent circumstances analysis.
The next reason good cause could not be established in this case (of
course, defense counsel didn't argue this reason) is the absence of a back-up
judge or any kind of redundancy system.

Again, the magistrate explained

when denying the motion to suppress:
At 11:00 p.m. there is only one on-call judge, and even if [the
on-call prosecutor] were to call another judge and get that judge
up, that judge isn't really situated to hear probable cause
because the one digital recorder we have is with the on-call
judge. So it's kind of a pickle when you can't reach the on-call
judge.
Tr. p. 41, Ins. 18-24.
While the system the state had provided to obtain warrants after
hours did leave the on-call prosecutor in a jam, it nevertheless does not
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provide good cause because again, as the district court put it, it is a factor
controllable in the court system itself. As our Supreme Court put it, good
cause must be shown for the unavailability of "an" on-call magistrate, not
"the" on-call magistrate, strongly suggesting a back-up must be available
where practical.
Regardless of what may be the case in small counties which are not
part of this case, the lack of a back-up judge is inexcusable in Ada County
There are 23 magistrates and 11 district judges in the Fourth Judicial
district, all of whom have the authority to issue a search warrant. I.C.R.
41(a).

Given this number of judges, there is no good cause excusing the

state's obligation to provide a functional and reliable system for obtaining
warrants after hours because the simple solution of a back-up judge is not
provided.
Nor is the fact that the court only has one digital tape recorder good
cause.

In this day and age where a free app can turn any smart phone into

a digital recorder, having only one tape recorder is not only not good cause, it
shows how little effort the state put into providing a functioning and reliable
system for obtaining warrants after hours.
Of course, while the state does not have to have a backup system, if it
does not it is at its peril. In other words, if the state chooses to not have a
backup system, if and when its system fails, it must be the state, and not
the defendant, who bears the loss. Here, something happened that was not
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intended and a problem arose.

The question is really, like in tort cases

where no one intended the harm but there is nevertheless harm, who bears
the loss? Here, rather than eroding Fourth Amendment protections with
what is essentially a negligence exception to the warrant requirement, it
should be the state who does by foregoing a misdemeanor DUI prosecution.
The state does not get one free bite violating Petitioner's constitutional
rights.
Another reason good cause cannot

be shown for the magistrate's

unavailability is because the prosecutor ended his attempts to contact the
on-call magistrate
ineffective.

after his

preferred contact method had proved

In other words, just because the magistrate's personal cell

phone was his preferred method, that doesn't mean it is the only way he can
be contacted if the preferred method isn't working.
How the on-call prosecutor went about trying to contact the
magistrate is a completely controllable factor. The state argued that it did
its best to obtain a warrant from the on-call judge.

That is not correct.

What the state did was attempt to reach a magistrate via his preferred
method of conduct and then stopped its efforts when that was unsuccessful.
The insufficiency of this is easily shown by what would have been done if
hypothetically, the state needed a warrant for important dissipating
evidence in a murder case. It cannot be seriously suggested the on-call
prosecutor would have authorized a warrantless search after the type of
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attempts in this case. Rather, if the magistrate did not answer it would
have been done the old-fashioned way, the police would have been sent to
the magistrate's house and knocked on the door until it was answered.
Of course, had the state provided a back-up system this sort of
measure would presumably not have been necessary. However, the state
does not get to limit its attempts to reach the magistrate and not have a
back-up system.
In summary, had the evidence of the reason for the magistrate's
unavailability not been stricken, the state could not have meet its burden of
showing good cause for the unavailability of "an" on-call magistrate, much
less "the" on-call magistrate. Without good cause, the inability of the on-call
prosecutor to obtain a warrant cannot be a factor for exigent circumstances
that allows a warrantless blood draw. In our case, there was no other factor
which would justify the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement. It was a run of the mill misdemeanor DUI, there was no wreck
or injuries. The lone factor present is the same one rejected by the United
States Supreme Court in McNeely as not enough without more, to wit, the
natural dissipation of alcohol over time.
Had defense counsel not objected and moved to strike the evidence
showing there was no good cause for the magistrate's unavailability, and
instead wrongly argued that the ability to obtain a warrant is not a factor
for determining exigent circumstances (more on this below), the Idaho
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Supreme Court would have reversed the denial of the motion to suppress (or
it would not have been denied in the first place).
Next, it can be determined without doubt that the outcome of the case
would have been different but for defense counsel's deficient performance.
Had the results of the warrantless blood draw been suppressed as they
should have been, Petitioner certainly would not have pled guilty to DUIexcess1ve. (Declaration of Daniel Chernobieff, attached hereto as Exhibit D,
para. 2.)

Without a blood alcohol content it was literally impossible for him

to be convicted of DUI-excessive, which requires a BAC of at least .20. LC.
section 18-8004C.
Also, as established by Petitioner's Declaration, he would not have
pled guilty to DUI, but would have demanded his right to a jury trial. (Id.
para. 3.) Even more significantly, he would not have even been prosecuted
as established by the prosecutor herself at the hearing when she argued:
... without applying the exception, the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement, a man who had been
driving intoxicated on the roads in the State of Idaho would not
be able to be prosecuted for his conduct.
Tr. p. 30, Ins. 1-5.

C) Defense counsel's performance is reviewable
In short, defense counsel's deficient performance 1s reviewable
because it was based on his ignorance of the law.
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In Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581 (2000), the Idaho Supreme Court
reiterated the well-established standard regarding tactical decisions made
by an attorney:
In addition, strategic and tactical decisions will not be second
guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is
shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance
of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective
review. [internal citations omitted]

Id., p. 584 (emphasis added).
Here, defense counsel obviously did not know the law related to
exigent circumstances.

Defense counsel not only kept out relevant and

meritorious evidence, but also argued the exact opposite of the controlling
law when he argued that exigent circumstances only applied to a
defendant/police scenario and not the state's ability to get a warrant.
Defense counsel argued:
There were no exigent circumstances in this case. If this court
is to determine that the inability of the prosecution to obtain a
warrant by contacting a judge justifies exigent circumstances, I
think that, (a), that is an improper factor to consider. Exigent
circumstances has to do with the factors of the case, of the
officer and the defendant.
Prosecutor Bandy said well one of the reasons was natural
dissipation of alcohol. McNeely makes it clear that that cannot
be one of the exigent circumstances. The prosecutor in her
argument said, well, one of the exigent circumstances is we
couldn't get a warrant. I don't think that is a proper factor.
The exigent circumstances has to do with whether or not the
defendant is intentionally delaying the process, it as [sic] to do
with other factors about Schmerber which the prosecutor cites
whether there's going to be a medical examination, whether
this person is going to have the opportunity to make an arrest
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or whether there's going to be subsequent hospitalization of
those items. And none of the factors are present.
To my mind what has been argued before this court today was
we saw a lot of signs they were intoxicated and time was a
wasting. And McNeely says that that is not the proper
analysis, that you have to have something more than just time.
Tr. p. 35, ln. 1-p. 36, ln. 4 (emphasis added)
Defense counsel's belief that the ability to obtain a warrant is not a
factor for exigent circumstances is the complete opposite of the actual,
controlling law. Significantly, it is not some esoteric point of law, rather, it
is repeatedly stated in NcNeely, a case of which defense counsel was aware
of because he cited and discussed it.

The majority opinion in NcNeely

stated as follows:
Although the Missouri Supreme Court referred to this case as
"unquestionably a routine DWI case," 358 S.W.3d, at 74, the
fact that a particular drunk-driving stop is "routine" in the
sense that it does not involve "'special facts,"' ibid., such as the
need for the police to attend to a car accident, does not mean a
warrant is not required. Other factors present in an ordinary
traffic stop, such as the procedures in place for obtaining a
warrant or the availability of a magistrate judge, may affect
whether the police can obtain a warrant in an expeditious way
and therefore may establish an exigency that permits a
warrantless search.
The relevant factors in determining
whether a warrantless search is reasonable, including the
practical problems of obtaining a warrant within a timeframe
that still preserves the opportunity to obtain reliable evidence,
will no doubt vary depending upon the circumstances in the
case.

McNeely, 569 U.S. 164, 133 S. Ct. 1568 (emphasis added).
The same point also appeared earlier in McNeely:
We by no means claim that telecommunications innovations
have, will, or should eliminate all delay from the warrantVerified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief-20

application process. Warrants inevitably take some time for
police officers or prosecutors to complete and for magistrate
judges to review. Telephonic and electronic warrants may still
require officers to follow time-consuming formalities designed
to create an adequate record, such as preparing a duplicate
warrant before calling the magistrate judge. See Fed. Rule
Crim. Proc. 4.l(b)(3). And improvements in communications
technology do not guarantee that a magistrate judge will be
available when an officer needs a warrant after making a latenight arrest. But technological developments that enable police
officers to secure warrants more quickly, and do so without
undermining the neutral magistrate judge's essential role as a
check on police discretion, are relevant to an assessment of
exigency. That is particularly so in this context, where BAC
evidence is lost gradually and relatively predictably.

McNeely, 569 U.S. 155, 133 S. Ct. 1562-1563 (emphasis added).
As least in Lexis, the relevance of delays in the warrant application
process is actually a headnote:
HN6 Search & Seizure, Exigent Circumstances
Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood sample
may arise in the regular course of law enforcement due to
delays from the warrant application process.

McNeely, 569 U.S. HN 6.
Defense counsel could not have been more wrong when he objected to
and moved to strike the exceptionally relevant evidence regarding the
practical problems in obtaining a warrant in this case and instead argued to
the court that the inability to obtain a warrant was not a proper factor to
consider.

Obviously, had defense counsel understood the law, he would not

have objected to the admission of evidence which established there was no
good cause for the magistrate's unavailability (or he would have otherwise
established it himself, for instance, by calling the magistrate).
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Likewise,

defense counsel would have argued that the lack of a backup system is also
contrary to good cause.
In Lankford v. Arave, 468 F.3d 578 (9 th Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit
discussed cognizable ineffective assistance of counsel based on the attorney's
submission in a state court murder trial of a jury instruction based on
federal law rather than the directly opposite Idaho law:
As we review FitzMaurice's performance, we must refrain from
second-guessing his strategies and acknowledge the "wide
range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689.
Nevertheless, we must hold FitzMaurice to his "duty to bring to
bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable
adversarial testing process." Id. at 688. Even considering
"conduct from counsel's perspective at the time," in at least one
respect, FitzMaurice's representation falls below the standard
of "reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. We agree
with the district court that there was no reasonable tactical
advantage in requiring an erroneous jury instruction that
would allow the jury to give greater weight to Bryan's [the
accomplice's] testimony. In this case, "[c]ounsel's errors with
the jury instructions were not a strategic decision to forego one
defense in favor of another.
They were the result of a
misunderstanding of the law." United States v. Span, 75 F.3d
1383, 1390 (9th Cir. 1996).

FitzMaurice's error is perhaps understandable, given his
limited experience and resources, but it is constitutionally
inexcusable. By inviting a jury instruction that misstated state
law and made it easier for the jury to convict his client, counsel
unwittingly undermined the very "adversarial testing process"
he was supposed to protect. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. We
agree with the district court that in this regard his performance
fell below the "range of reasonable professional assistance." Id.
at 689.

Lankford, p. 583-586 (italicized emphasis m the original, underlined
emphasis added).
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Our case is the same. A review of McNeely, the very case the parties

were arguing about, plainly showed that the ability to get a warrant is a
relevant factor to exigent circumstances.

There could be no tactical

advantage to eliminating the need for the state to meet its burden of
showing good cause for the unavailability of an on-call magistrate by
objecting to and having stricken the evidence that showed there was no good
cause, and, instead, arguing the opposite of the controlling law.
To conclude, defense counsel here was wrong about something that he
should not have been wrong about (McNeely).

Thus, defense counsel's

ignorance of the actual law allows his deficient performance to be reviewed,
which includes, but is not necessarily limited to, his objection, motion to
strike, failure to otherwise argue the correct law and failure to present
relevant evidence.

Prejudice has also been established because had the

motion to suppress been granted (or the case reversed), without the blood
drawn Petitioner clearly would not have pled guilty to DUI-excessive, would
not have pled guilty to DUI at all, and actually would not have been
prosecuted for DUI according to the state.

Thus, Petitioner respectfully

requests this Court reverse and vacate his conviction.

9.

IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS
(a)

Are you seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, that
is, requesting the proceeding to be at county expense? No.

(b)

Are you requesting the appointment of counsel to represent you
in this application? No.
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10.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF: Petitioner requests the following relief:
A.

B.
proper.

That the conviction be vacated; and/or
For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and

Respectively submitted this 7th

day of December, 2017.

Isl Greg S. Silvey
Greg S. Silvey
Attorney for Petitioner
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VERIFICATION OF PETITION
I, Daniel Chernobieff, hereby declare under penalty of perjury, depose
and say that I have subscribed to this petition; that I know the contents of
it; and that the matters and allegations set forth are true.
I certify or declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State
of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct, and that I am physically
located outside the geographical boundaries of the United States, Puerto
Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, and any territory or insular
possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. By signing this
declaration I am submitting myself to the jurisdiction of the State of Idaho
for purposes of enforcing the penalty of perjury as it relates to this
declaration.
Executed on the 7-"hday of December, at Bagram, Afghanistan,

~FF
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of December, 2017, I
ca used a true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading to be served via the
file and serve system to the email identified as the party's service contact:
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
200 West Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
acpocourtdocs@ada.web.net

Isl Greg S. Silvey
Greg S. Silvey
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DECLARATION
GREG S. SILVEY, hereby declares under penalty of perjury as follows:
1) I am the counsel of record for petitioner in this action.
2) Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the slip opinion of the Idaho Supreme
Court opinion in the underlying criminal case, State v. Chernobiejf, 161 Idaho 537 (2016),
Supreme Court docket No. 43112/44259, Ada County No. CR-MD-2013-13271.
3) Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of the transcript of the motion to suppress
hearing in Ada County No. CR-MD-2013-13271.
4) Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the Opinion on Appeal issued by the
district court sitting as an appellate court in Ada County No. CR-MD-2013-13271.
5) Attached hereto as Exhibit Dis a true and correct copy of the Declaration of Daniel Chemobieff.
I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that
the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on the 7th

day of December, 201 7.
/s/ Greg S. Silvey
Greg S. Silvey
Attorney at Law

EXHIBIT A
Supreme Court Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 44259
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DANIEL CHERNOBIEFF,
Defendant-Appellant.

Boise, December 2016 Term
2016 Opinion No. 156
Filed: December 30, 2016
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Daniel Steckel, Magistrate Judge; Hon. Gerald F.
Schroeder, Senior District Judge.
The decision of the district court is affirmed.
Silvey Law Office, Ltd., Boise, for appellant. Greg S. Silvey argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Jessica M. Lorello argued.

J. JONES, Chief Justice
Daniel Chemobieff appeals the denial of his motion to suppress the results of a
warrantless blood draw. Following the magistrate court's denial of the motion, Chemobieff
entered a conditional guilty plea. On appeal, the district court affirmed the magistrate court's
denial of the motion to suppress. Chemobieff timely appealed.

I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 11, 2013, at around 11 :00 p.m., Idaho State Police Corporal Matthew Sly
responded to a request for assistance from another officer who had pulled Chemobieff over in a
traffic stop. Upon arrival, Corporal Sly noticed the odor of an alcoholic beverage, that
Chemobieffs eyes were "glassy and bloodshot," and that his speech was "slow and lethargic."
Corporal Sly also noticed that Chemobieff was agitated and appeared to have difficulty
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answering questions. Based upon these observations, Corporal Sly asked Chernobieff to perform
standard field sobriety tests, but Chernobieff refused. Consequently, Corporal Sly placed
Chernobieff under arrest for suspicion of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and placed him in
the patrol car. In the car, Corporal Sly played the audio version of the administrative license
suspension form for Chernobieff and began the fifteen minute wait period required for a breath
test. However, Chernobieff refused the breath test. Corporal Sly then contacted the on-call
prosecutor for assistance in obtaining a warrant for a blood sample. The prosecutor asked
Corporal Sly to transport Chernobieff to the jail, where a conference call would be set up with
the on-call magistrate to obtain a search warrant. The prosecutor then unsuccessfully attempted
to contact the magistrate. Over approximately ten minutes, the prosecutor attempted to call the
magistrate between three and five times and left one or two voicemail messages. Unable to reach
the magistrate to obtain a warrant, the prosecutor directed Corporal Sly to perform a blood draw
due to exigent circumstances. Corporal Sly contacted the phlebotomist to perform a blood draw,
and the test results indicated Chernobieff’s blood alcohol content was 0.226.
The State charged Chernobieff with DUI with an excessive blood alcohol content.
Chernobieff filed a motion to suppress, asserting that the warrantless blood draw violated his
rights under both the United States and Idaho Constitutions. The magistrate court denied
Chernobieff’s motion, finding that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement applied under the specific facts of this case. Subsequently, Chernobieff filed a
conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
Chernobieff timely appealed to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate court’s decision.
Chenobieff again appealed and the Idaho Courts of Appeals affirmed. Chernobieff sought, and
the Supreme Court granted, review.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“When reviewing a case on petition for review from the Court of Appeals this Court
gives due consideration to the decision reached by the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the
decision of the trial court.” State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 839, 252 P.3d 1255, 1257 (2011). “On
appeal of a decision rendered by a district court while acting in its intermediate appellate
capacity, this Court directly reviews the district court’s decision.” In re Doe, 147 Idaho 243, 248,
207 P.3d 974, 979 (2009). “In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress
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evidence, this Court will defer to the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous.” State
v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 470, 20 P.3d 5, 6 (2001).
III.
ANALYSIS
The question before the Court is whether exigent circumstances existed to justify the
warrantless blood draw. Chenobieff asserts the blood draw violated his constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures and, consequently, that the district court erred in
affirming the magistrate court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the
blood draw.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of every citizen to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend IV. “Requiring that a person submit to a
blood alcohol test is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.” State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416,
418, 337 P.3d 575, 577 (2014).
Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. To overcome this presumption of unreasonableness, the
search must fall within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
Exigency and consent are two well-recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement.
Id. at 419, 337 P.3d at 578. (internal citations omitted) “Whether a warrantless blood test of a
drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the
circumstances.” Missouri v. McNeely, ____ U.S. ______, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1563 (2013).
“[E]xigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood sample may arise in the regular course of
law enforcement due to delays from the warrant application process.” Id. However, “while the
natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific
case . . . it does not do so categorically.” Id. “In those drunk-driving investigations where police
officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without
significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they
do so.” Id. at 1561
The district court affirmed the denial of Chernobieff’s motion to suppress the blood test
results, finding that the magistrate’s determination of exigent circumstances was supported by
the record. The magistrate noted delays in the proceedings leading up to the blood draw,
including the delay resulting from the inability of the prosecutor to contact the on-call magistrate
3
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in order to obtain a warrant and the fact that the level of alcohol in the blood dissipates over time.
Although the record does not contain a specific timeline, it took some time for Corporal Sly to
arrive on the scene, to play the administrative license suspension audio, to begin the 15 minute
waiting period for a breath test, to transport Chernobieff to jail, and to contact the phlebotomist.
The magistrate noted that some delay resulted from Chernobieff’s refusal to perform field
sobriety tests. The magistrate specifically mentioned that the prosecutor made a good-faith effort
to reach a judge for a warrant, that the on-call judge could not be contacted in a number of
attempts, that there was no back-up process to get a different judge, and that the prosecutor
“appears to have done all he could to get a judge’s permission to take the blood in a timely
fashion.” The district court, while upholding the magistrate’s findings, observed that the inability
to reach the on-call judge is “a problem one might expect more in a small county rather than in
Ada County” and that “this breakdown has been exposed and can be addressed by a redundancy
system, at least where multiple judges are available.”
Chernobieff argues that the magistrate essentially concluded that when a prosecutor acts
in good faith to obtain a warrant and is unsuccessful, a warrant is not required. Chernobieff
contends that this ruling creates a per se exigency, which is prohibited by McNeely. He asserts
the ruling means that any time the system fails there is a categorical exception allowing the
prosecutor to claim exigent circumstances and draw blood without a warrant. Chernobieff further
claims that the magistrate court did not analyze the totality of the circumstances, confining his
focus to the prosecutor’s effort to obtain a warrant. Additionally, he argues that the failure to
obtain a warrant was the product of human error, not of external circumstances, such as phone
communications going down in a storm. Chernobieff claims the delay in the present case was
only five to ten minutes and that the prosecutor should have made additional attempts to contact
the magistrate or tried other means to contact the magistrate, or that some sort of backup system
should have been in place to reach a second magistrate.
In response, the State cites the Supreme Court’s observation in McNeely that “[e]xigent
circumstances justifying a warrantless blood sample may arise in the regular course of law
enforcement due to delays from the warrant application process.” 133 S.Ct at 1563. The State
notes that the exigency in this case was created by the dissipation of alcohol and the inability to
obtain a warrant despite the efforts of Corporal Sly and the prosecutor to do so. The State asserts
that these factors do not create a categorical exception as Chernobieff contends. The State argues
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that under the totality of the circumstances, there was an exigency created by dissipation of
alcohol in Chernobieff’s system and the delays occasioned in the warrant process.
The State argues that it was only after the unsuccessful attempts to contact the magistrate
that the prosecutor instructed Corporal Sly to arrange for the blood draw under the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. The State claims that the Fourth
Amendment does not require law enforcement to contact the magistrate through alternative
methods, or to wait some indeterminate period of time after the prosecutor has made numerous
unsuccessful attempts to contact the magistrate. The State argues that an external emergency is
similarly not required. It asserts that the relevant question is whether the warrantless search
would prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. McNeely, 133 S.Ct at 1558. The State
concludes that Corporal Sly “could not reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample
[could] be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search.” Id. at 1561.
The proper analysis for determining if exigent circumstances exist is whether, under the
totality of the circumstances of the case, the needs of law enforcement were sufficiently
compelling that it was reasonable to conduct the blood draw without a warrant. McNeely, 133
S.Ct. at 1558. In its appellate review, the district court considered a number of factors, including
the lateness of the hour, the various delays that occurred in the proceedings from the time
Corporal Sly was called, and the dissipation in the level of blood alcohol with the passage of
time. The district court specifically pointed to the prosecutor’s attempt to obtain a warrant
through the on-call magistrate who could not be reached. The district court also made reference
to the delay resulting from Chernobieff’s refusal to perform field sobriety tests, but in doing so
the court erred. Any delay caused by Chernobieff’s exercise of his Constitutional rights may not
be considered. The court concluded that the magistrate considered the totality of circumstances
and that the magistrate’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. We concur. Even
excluding the delay related to the field sobriety tests, there was substantial evidence to support
the magistrate’s findings. Therefore, we find that the district court did not err in affirming the
denial of the motion to suppress the results of the blood draw.
The district court’s observation regarding the inability to contact the on-call magistrate,
particularly in Ada County where there are a number of magistrate judges, does raise some
concern. The State has an obligation to provide a functional and reliable system for obtaining
warrants in circumstances like these, both during regular office hours and through the night and
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on weekends. When an on-call magistrate is unable to be reached by law enforcement, the State
has the burden of showing why that is the case and that good cause exists for the unavailability.
Here, the State sought to present evidence as to the reason for the magistrate’s unavailability, but
defense counsel objected and the evidence was stricken from the record. With no such evidence
in the record, the Court presumes that the trial court ruled correctly. Poole v. Davis, 153 Idaho
604, 607, 288 P.3d 821, 824 (2012).
IV.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court is affirmed.
Justices EISMANN, BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.
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EXHIBIT B
Transcript of hearing on Motion to Suppress
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THE CLERK: Do you swear the testimony you

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2014

1

***

shall give today shall be the truth, the whole truth,
3

3

and nothing but the truth so help you God.

THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.
THECOURT: Hi, Corporal, thank you for

THE COURT: We are here on Mr. -- how do you
5

say his name?

MS. SIMMONS: Chernobieff.

being here. Sorry to keep you waiting. Do you need

THE COURT: -- Chernobieff's motion to

water or anything?

THE WITNESS: Maybe some water.
THE COURT: Mr. Bandy is going to rise to

suppress. I have read both your motion Mr. Deaton
9
10

and I've read the state's response, and I think we're
having a hearing, right?

10

11

MS. SIMMONS: Yes, your Honor.

11

12

THE COURT: I see you brought the big guns.

12

13

MS. SIMMONS: I did.
THE COURT: And I meant the officer, not

13

14
15

15

How do you want to proceed? Is the
burden shifting, have you agreed as to who is

17

18

starting out here?

18

20

MR. DEATON: I think the burden is

22
23
24

25

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MS. SIMMONS:

19

Q.

Good afternoon, Corporal Sly?
Good afternoon.

20

A.

THE COURT: Are you okay with that?
MS. SIMMONS: I'm fine with that.

21

Q.

How are you doing today?

22

A.

I'm good.

THE COURT: So whenever the state is ready.
MS. SIMMONS: Your Honor, the state first

23

Q.

Thanks for making the trip down, we

sufficiently shifted.

21

CPL. MATTHEW SLY
having been duly sworn, testified as follows:

16

17

19

MS. SIMMONS: That's the reason we brought
him down here.

14

you.

16

the occasion.

calls Corporal Matt Sly.

24

really appreciate it. To get started, can you state

25

your name and spell your last for the record.

5

A

It's Matthew K. Sly, S-L-Y.

THE COURT: Overruled.

2

Q.

Where are you employed, Corporal Sly?

THE WITNESS: One of our troopers had made a

3

A.

The Idaho State Police.

Q.

And how long have you been with the

Idaho State Police?
7

A.

Just over ten years.

Q.

And what are your current duties with

3

the interstate in Meridian, and he had asked for
5

BY MS. SIMMONS:
Q. Okay. And why had he initiated the

I'm currently assigned to District 3

traffic stop?

10

patrol at Meridian, and I work on the DUI enforcement

10

11

team.

11

Q.

12
13
14

Q.

15
16

A.

I was in District 3 Meridian, the

patrol office.

Q.

19
20

And where were you located that

evening?

17

18

Were you on duty on the evening of

September 11 of 2013?
A. Yes, I was.

respond to any calls that evening?

MS. SIMMONS: I'll rephrase the question.

14

Q.

15

A.

Yes, l did.

17

Q.

What sort of investigation did you

A.

After I arrived on scene, the trooper

19

who made the stop walked back to my car and he told
me the reason --

Yes, I did.

21

Q.

Where did you respond to?

22

23

lb

One of our troopers had made a traffic

23
24

MR. DEATON: Objection, hearsay.

begin?

20

A.

25

When you arrived, did you begin an

investigation?

16

22

stop --

THE COURT: Your response?

12

21

24

MR. DEATON: Objection, hearsay,
speculation.

13

18

At the patrol office. And did you

backup assistance, and so I left the patrol office
and then responded to where he was at.

the State Police?

A.

traffic stop on southbound Meridian Road just before

25

MR. DEATON: Objection, hearsay.
THE COURT: Your response?
BY MS. SIMMONS:
Q.

Corporal Sly, if you can simply inform

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

the court what sort of investigation you began

questioning. Thank you.

Q.

without referring to any comments made to you by your
3

A.

I began a DUI investigation.

Q.

Thank you.

physical appearance?

A.

10

to him that I could smell the odor of an alcoholic

A.

Yes.

beverage coming from inside the vehicle and I noticed

Q.

And can you describe your contact with

also his eyes were glassy and bloodshot. So I again

that individual, please?

A.

11

When I originally asked him to step out

of the vehicle, he asked me why, and so I explained

Did you make contact with the driver of
the vehicle?

a

When you asked the defendant to step

outside of the vehicle, what did you observe of his

co-worker.

He was identified by a Hawaii driver's

10

11

asked him to step out of the vehicle and he said,
11

for what reason," or something to that effect, and

12

license that I received as Daniel Chernobieff -- I'm

12

so I explained to him that I needed him to step out

13

not sure if I'm saying that correctly -- and so I

13

of the vehicle to make sure that he was safe to be

14

walked up to his vehicle, he was sitting in the

14

driving down the roadway, and at that point he agreed

15

driver's seat, the keys were removed from the vehicle

15

and said he would.

16

and the window was down. And so I identified myself

16

11

and asked him to step out and to the rear of his

11

observe anything prior him stepping out with regard

1s

vehicle.

10

to his conduct or when he was, for example, reaching

19

for paperwork or anything like that?

19

Q.

Are you aware of the reason for the

Q.

A.

While he was in his vehicle, did you

I didn't notice anything -- that he

20

traffic stop, what sort of driving pattern was

20

21

observed?

21

reached for any paperwork. The other officer had

22

already taken care of that.

22
23

MR. DEATON: Objection, hearsay,
speculation, outside his personal knowledge.

23

MR. DEATON: Objection, hearsay.
THE COURT: Overruled.

24

THE COURT: Your response, Ms. Simmons?

24

25

MS. SIMMONS: I'll continue with

25

10

BY MS. SIMMONS:
Q. You can go ahead.
3

A.

And when he -- I was told that when he

that he began to talk, and I noticed that he was -it gave me the appearance that he was going to stick
3

said, 11 absolutely not," and when he did, he seemed to

MR. DEATON: Objection, hearsay, lack of

become agitated, and I was within close enough

personal knowledge.
1

his hands in his pocket. So I told him, "don't stick
your hands in your pocket," and he looked at me and

was reaching for the paperwork --

THE COURT: That one might be hearsay. I

distance to be able to talk to him because I was
working my way up to begin the standardized field

don't know where we are going.
10

MS. SIMMONS: I'm sorry.
Q. Corporal Sly, we have to avoid

10

him outside the car, when he said that, I could

11

introducing hearsay into evidence today so you can't

11

definitely smell the strong odor of an alcoholic

12

testify with regard to comments that were made to you

12

beverage on his breath.

13

by your co-worker that evening, Trooper Comorosky.

13

14

So if you can limit your responses to your

14

sobriety evaluations, and when I was close enough to

And I told him that I Just didn't want
him to stick his hands in his pockets, and he then

15

interactions with the defendant, your observations of

15

said that he wasn't going to answer any of my

16

the defendant, thank you.

16

questions, or something to that effect.

Q.

And so based on your observations of

11

Okay. So once the defendant was

11

10

outside of the vehicle, he consented to exit the

1a

the defendant up to this point, had you reached any

19

vehicle, and what happened next?

19

conclusions about the state of his person, about

20

whether or not he should have been driving that
night?

20

A.

When we walked back, we passed his

21

vehicle, we passed Trooper Comorosky's vehicle and so

21

22

we were now in front of my patrol vehicle and at the

22

23

back of Trooper Comorosky's vehicle, so we were in

23

24

front of my camera. And once we were back there, I'd

24

THE COURT: Any response to that?

25

asked him where he was coming from, and shortly after

25

MS. SIMMONS: If the court would prefer, I

MR. DEATON: Objection, vague, improper
opinion, outside of his expertise.

I

12

11

I
I

3

I

I
I

I
I
I

to start from the beginning about where he was coming
from, and he basically said something to the effect

When I was talking to him, I could

9

I

I
I
I
I
I
I

I

of, "I'd like to be able to answer a question without
you accusing me of," and then there was kind of a

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

5

long pause. And a couple of times when I was asking

6

him some questions like that, he would start to

smell the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage and

answer a question and then he would stop for a couple

when I was speaking to him when I would ask him

of seconds like he maybe had forgotten what he was

questions, it appeared his speech was slow and

going to say or how he was going to end the sentence,

10

lethargic to me is what it appeared. And, you know,

10

11

in my past experience when I've asked people to come

11

12

out of the vehicle, usually I can only count probably

12

and so that happened a couple other times.
And so based on the odor of an
alcoholic beverage, his glassy and bloodshot eyes

13

on one hand in the last ten years when somebody

13

when his speech being the way it was, because it

14

either didn't act like they wanted to get out of

14

appeared to me it was slurred, and with his agitation

15

vehicle or they questioned me about the reason why

15

towards me, those things all added up to it me

16

several times. So those two things, the initial

16

there's a possibility that he was definitely probably

17

contact in the car, made me believe this person has

17

potentially under the influence of alcohol.

18

been drinking alcoholic beverages.

18

And so when I brought him back to talk

Q,

Now, based on that conclusion that you

19

had reached, did you request that the defendant

20

to him further in front of my patrol car, especially

20

perform any standardized field sobriety tests?

21

smelling the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on

21

A.

Yes, I did.

22

his breath and it appeared to me that he became

22

Q.

And did he do so?

23

agitated when I asked him not to place his hands in

23

A.

No.

24

his pockets, and he at that point just didn't want to

24

Q,

What happened after he refused to

25

talk to me anymore. And so I asked him kind of again

25

19

performed those standardized field sobriety tests?

13

A.

I

3

objection. You can answer.
5

I
I

can ask the corporal to describe his training and
experience with DUI investigations.
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the

I told him he was under arrest, placed

handcuffs on him behind his back, checked them for
3

14

the breath sample, and he said he didn't trust him
2

either. So he refused to take the breath test.

proper fit, double locked them, took him to the front

Q.

And what did you do next?

of my patrol car and searched him in front of my car

A.

While I was still there I contacted

5

and checked inside of his mouth for any foreign

the -- I called dispatch and got the phone number for

6

material. I did not find anything of consequences on

the on-call Ada County prosecutor.

Q.
A.

his person. Then I placed him in the right rear seat
of my patrol vehicle. And then the trooper that was
9

there initially, he left, and then I began the ALS

And why did you do that?
Based on everything that I had, the

evidence that led up to that point, I had a feeling

10

audio version, the audio version of the ALS and then

10

that he was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or

11

began the 15 minute waiting period.

11

other intoxicating substances at that point.

12
13

Q.

And you did that because you intended

to administer a breath alcohol test?

12
13

Q.

What did you need from the prosecutor

in order to move forward?

14

A.

Yes.

14

15

Q.

Did you administer that test?

15

16

A.
Q.
A.

No.

16

I was going to try to contact the judge to set up a

Why not?

17

conference call in order to obtain a search warrant

Chernobieff refused to take the breath

18

for a blood sample.

17
18
19
20
21

test because he said he didn't trust me.

19

Q.

What happened next?

20

A.

One of my patrol sergeants arrived on

21

A.

I needed to obtain a search warrant for

a blood sample, and so in order to do that we were --

Q.

And just one step back, when did you

make this phone call, where were you at?

A.

I was still -- when I first made the

22

scene who didn't have anything to do with the traffic

22

call I was at the scene before I went down to the Ada

23

stop initially, he was there, and I thought well

23

County Jail just to -- because it was late in the

24

maybe he just had a problem with me, so I'd ask would

24

evening -- I don't remember exactly what time it was

25

you have a problem if the patrol sergeant performed

25

but close to midnight probably. So I made a call

16

15

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

l

3

while I was out there and talked to the on-call

Q.

Did he call you back?

prosecutor to let him know what was going on and give

A.

Yes, he did.

Q.

Had he obtained an authorization for a

him a heads up that I would need to probably be going
in that direction.

Q.
6

warrant?

A.

So you made that phone call and what

happened.

A.

6

After I made the phone call I talked to

MR.DEATON: I going to object as hearsay as

the prosecutor, Scott Bandy, and he said once I got

to the truth of the matter asserted. As to the

to the jail to give him a call back and he would make
10

effect on what he did, I have no objection. But if

a call to the on-call judge for that evening.

10

he 1s going to testify to what Scott Bandy did, I

11

Q.

So you proceeded to the jail?

11

object to that.

12

A.

Yes.

12

13

Q.

And did you make a phone call when you

13

THE COURT: I do see that Mr. Bandy is here.
Do you want to proceed on this line? You're free to
respond to his objection.
MS. SIMMONS: 11II just rephrase the

14

arrived at the jail?

14

15

A.

Yes, I did.

15

16

Q.

To who?

16

question and move on and we will have Mr. Bandy

17

A.

I called prosecutor Scott Bandy back.

17

testify in a moment with regard to what he said on

Q.

And what happened after that after you

18

the phone.

19

Q.

18
19
20

made that phone call?

A.

He told me to stay on the line that he

20

I
I
I
I
I

So did you obtain a warrant to get the

blood draw?

21

would attempt to make a phone call to the on-call

21

A.

No.

22

judge at that time, and so he told me it may be --

22

Q.

And so what did you do next?

A.

After talking with prosecutor Bandy, he

23

well, initially he tried to make a call and then

23

24

nobody answered the phone. So he told me give him

24

told me to go ahead and take blood due to exigent

25

five or ten minutes and he would call me back.

25

ci rcu msta nces.

17

Q.
A.

.5
~

18

A.

And so did you do so?
Yes.

Q.

And how did you make that happen?

A.

We called the company that we use in

Trooper Comorosky?

order to obtain a blood sample. A phlebotomist

5

showed up and drew blood from his arm, and after I

6

forensic lab.

Q.

Mr. Deaton.
10

Was there anything unusual or

remarkable about the way in which the blood was taken

12

13

based on your training and experience?

13

A.

Well, we have a standardized blood kit

CROSS-EXAMINATION

11

12

14

No.
Thank you. Those are all my questions

THE COURT: Whenever you're ready

processed into evidence where it was sent to the
10

A.
Q.
for you.

it went back to our district office and then it was

11

I watched my video from the traffic

stop when I initially got there.
Q.
Did you watch a video prepared by

booked him into jail, then I took the blood sample,

I
I

No. He attempted a few times, I don't

know how many --

BY MR. DEATON:
Q.

Trooper Sly, you indicated you felt

14

authorized to it take a blood draw based on exigent
circumstances, is that right?

15

'that we use that is given to us, and in that blood

15

16

kit it has all of the things that the phlebotomist

16

A.

That's not what I said.

17

needs, such as an iodine swab, things of that nature,

17

Q.

Could you tell me what your

18

which was used, I watched the phlebotomist use it and

18

understandi~g of what the exigent circumstances were

19

obtained the blood sample. And so that was about it.

19

that evening?

20
21

Q.

In preparation for your testimony

today, did you watch any videos --

20

A.

Based on the odor of an alcoholic

21

beverage and based on his glassy and bloodshot eyes
and based on his demeanor towards me during the

Yes.

22

-- that were created that evening?

23

traffic stop and also with him not being able to

24

A.
Q.
A.

Yes.

24

complete -- not all the time it didn't happen -- but

25

Q.

And what videos did you watch?

25

a few times not able to complete sentence where he

22
23

20

19

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I

THE COURT: Anything based on that?

would stop and then lose track, at least it gave me
the appearance he was losing track of what he was
3

saying. Based on those, that's why I called the

THE COURT: That's it. Thank you very much.

prosecutor to find out how to proceed.

Q.
6

Okay. And were those the exigent

Either of you want the trooper to stick around?

circumstances that existed that you believed

MR. DEATON:

justified taking the blood without a warrant?

THE COURT: Anything further from the State?

A.

I

1 have no need for the trooper.

MS. SIMMONS: Yes, your Honor the state

I believed that the information that I

provided to the prosecutor, that's why I did that,

calls prosecutor Scott Bandy.

THE CLERK: Do you swear the testimony you

10

was in order to obtain the proper method of being

10

11

able to obtain a blood sample and if I didn't have

11

shall give today shall be the truth, the whole truth,

12

the authorization then that wouldn't have been done.

12

and nothing but the truth so help you God.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Q.

Who gave you the authorization that

13

A.

Prosecutor Scott Bandy.

15

Mr. Deaton salivating. All right. Whenever you're

16

ready.

night?

MR. DEATON: Thank you.
THE COURT: Anything further.
MS. SIMMONS: No additional questions.
THE COURT: I do have one question for you

18

SCOTT BANDY

19

officer. I know the answer but I'm going to ask it

20

21

to you any way. On the citation it says this

21

22

occurred at 11:11 a.m. on I believe it's a Wednesday,

22

23

September 11th, is that accurate?

23

25

MS. SIMMONS: Thank you, your Honor.

17

20

24

THE WITNESS: I do.
THE COURT: Good afternoon Mr. Bandy, I see

14

THE WITNESS: If it says 11:11 a.m. that

24

would be incorrect. It would have been in the p.m.

25

having been duly sworn, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. SIMMONS:
Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Bandy. Thanks for
coming down today, last minute notice on that. I

22

21

A.

appreciate it.
Can you describe for the court's

2

benefit --

I did, I -- again, I don't recall what

time of the early morning it was but it was from
3

THE COURT: I know it's silly, but just

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

MR.DEATON: No, your Honor.
MS. SIMMONS: No, your Honor.

2

Trooper Sly. He initially called me from the field
indicating that he was performing a DUI investigation

spell your name.

and may this been need of a search warrant for a

THE WITNESS: Scott Bandy, B-A-N-D-Y.

blood draw.

Q.

THE COURT: Thank you.

BY MS. SIMMONS:

And what did you do after you received

that phone call?

A.

9

Q.

Where were you employed Mr. Bandy?

10

A.

I'm a deputy prosecutor for Ada County.

10

of the reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop,

11

Q.

And can you describe generally what

11

the PC for the investigation and the request for the

12

blow, as well as how the driver articulated his

13

refusal to submit to a breathalyzer.

12
13
14
15
16
17

your duties are with regard to that position.

A.

Currently I'm a felony trial team

leader assigned to Judge Neville and Judge Moody.

Q.

And does part of your position entail

being on call at times?

A.

Yes, I'm part of a four-person rotation

9

14

Q.

15

conclude?

A.

16
17

I had Trooper Sly give me a run through

Based on what he told you, what did you
I concluded that we should seek the

approval of the on-call magistrate for a blood draw

18

about one week a month that handles general calls for

18

warrant to secure a sample of the driver's blood due

19

legal advice, requests to obtain search warrants in

19

to the evanescent nature of blood alcohol dissipating

20

the off hours of the day after 5:00 p.m.

21
22

Q,

And were you responsible for that

obligation on the evening of September 11, 2013?

20

rapidly from the bloodstream, time was of the

21

essence.

22

23

A.

I was.

23

24

Q.

And did you receive any phone calls

24

25

that evening?

25

Q.

And so the phone call ended with the

corporal, and what did you do next?

A.

I instructed the corporal that I would

make efforts to contact the on-call magistrate, which

24

23

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I

A.

I believe at the time was Judge Mike Oths, and that I
3

would call him back or that he should call me back if

2

he hadn't heard from me once he arrived at the

3

And I can tell you for sure it was

three, it could have been five. It's early morning.
I did leave at least one voice mail, maybe two. I

station at the in-tox room or at the Ada County Jail

did confer with Judge Mike Oths the next day and

where the phlebotomist was going to respond.

found that his ringer was off on his cell phone.

6

Q.

Did he return your call?

A.

He did. In the interim I had attempted

MR. DEATON: Objection, move to strike that
as hearsay, speculation.

THE COURT: Well, I don't think it's

to call on-call Magistrate Mike Oths using the
personal cell number of his that I have that is his

relevant. I don't know that be it's -- I'll sustain

10

requested method of contact. I called that number

10

the objection. Took me a while to get there. Go

11

and received no response. I repeated the call to

11

ahead.

12

make sure that I had dialed the correct number. I

12

13

had, I received his voice mail and left him a voice

13

14

mail requesting that he return my call and the nature

14

call the judge in while you were on the phone with

15

of my call was to request a blood draw warrant.

15

Corporal Sly, you were unable to do so. So what

16

happened next?

Q.

16
17

So how many times total did you call

that number?

17

BY MS. SIMMONS:
Q. Okay. So you attempted to conference

A.

At that point I informed Trooper Sly

19

A. I'm not sure if it was three or four,
but I believe it was at least three. Upon the third

20

call was when I had made contact with Trooper Sly, I

20

inability to get in touch with him, that we would

21

attempted to conference call in the judge, at which

21

then default back to exigent circumstances that would

22

time I received no response again and left a

22

provide an exception to the warrant requirement due

23

subsequent message.

23

to the unavailability of securing a warrant in a

24

timely fashion.

18

Q.

24
25

18
19

Okay. So you made four to five

attempts to contact the on-call judge?

25

that we had made substantial efforts to try and
contact the on-call magistrate and that based on our

MS. SIMMONS: No further questions. Thank

25

26

you.
2
3

7

10
11

12
13

this state shall be deemed to have given his

THE COURT: Mr. Deaton.
MR. DEATON: I am loathe to do this. I have
no further questions.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bandy.
THE WITNESS: Thanks judge.

2

consent to evidentiary testing for
concentration of alcohol provided that such
testing is administered at the request of a
peace officer having reasonable grounds to
believe that person has been driving or in

THE COURT: Anything further from the State?

actual physical control of a motor vehicle

MS. SIMMONS: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Deaton?
MR.DEATON: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: Any argument for the State?
MS. SIMMONS: Yes, your Honor.

while drunk."

Your Honor, the defendant's motion to

This statute has been repeatedly upheld
10

in it Idaho in State v. Diaz, as the court knows.

11

Also more recently in State v. Wheeler where the

12

Court of Appeals held that protests to a blood draw

13

do not invalidate implied consent.

14

suppress fails in this instance because two

14

15

exceptions to the requirement of a warrant exist in

15

United States Supreme Court's recent case in Missouri

16

this case. Those two exceptions are the consent

16

v. McNeely. That case had a limited holding. The

Of course the court is aware of the

17

exception and the exigent circumstances exception.

17

holding in that case was that the practice whereby

18

These are two well-recognized exceptions nationally

18

law enforcement concludes that the natural

19

and here in Idaho.

19

metabolization of alcohol gives rise in every

20
21

Pursuant to Idaho Code 18-8002(1), the
consent requirement is met via an implied consent

20

instance to exigent circumstances to a per se

21

exigency, that practice is proscribed no~ under
McNeely. The State has no dispute of that.

22

doctrine that is codified at that code section. That .

22

23

code section provides in part that:

23

24
25

"Any person who drives or is in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle in

That however is not the case here.

24

There were multiple circumstances, totality of

25

circumstances in the instant case that gave rise to

28

27
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an exigency that triggered an exception to the
2

"Our decision in Schmerber applied

The court in McNeely expressly made

3

5

McNeely case from 2013:

requirement of a warrant.
reference to states that have implied consent

In that case the petitioner had suffered

statutes and did not rule on the matter and in fact

injuries in an automobile accident and was

stated more or less that implied consent statutes are

I
I

I
I
I
I
I

I

taken to the hospital. While he was there

6

valid -- they did the rule that they were valid but
8

receiving treatment, a police officer arrested
the petitioner for driving while under the

they made reference to them and said that they have
their place and that there is utility to the implied

10

consent statutes.

over his objection."

10

The court in McNeely also reasoned that

11

influence of alcohol and ordered a blood test

9

"After explaining that the warrant

11

12

the availability of retrograde extrapolation

12

13

overcomes any such exigency, and that rational was

13

14

the basis for the holding that per se exigency does

14

conclude that the warrantless blood test in

15

not exist.

15

the present case was nonetheless permissible

Now in Idaho the court knows that

requirement applied generally to searches that
intrude into the human body, the Supreme Court

16

because the officer might reasonably have

17

believed that he was confronted with an

having an blood breath or urine alcohol concentration

18

emergency in which the delay necessary to

below 0.08 will not be prosecuted for DUI. So the

19

obtain a warrant under the circumstances

20

availability of retrograde extrapolation is not

20

threatened the destruction of evidence."

21

available to law enforcement or prosecution in Idaho.
One moment, please.

21

16
17

pursuant to Idaho Code 18-8004(2) that any person

18
19

22

The court goes onto say:
"Our analysis in Schmerber fits

22
23

comfortably within our case law applying the

24

referred to and relied upon its prior case from 1966,

24

exigent circumstances exception."

25

Schmerber v. California, and 11II quote from the

25

23

Now, the court in McNeely expressly

They upheld that totality of the

30

29

circumstances analysis that looked to everything that

I

this totality of the circumstances approach.

3

2

had happened that evening to determine whether or not

3

an exigency existed in the case.

without applying the exception, the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, a
3

Your Honor, in the present case the

man who had been driving while intoxicated on the
roads in the State of Idaho would not be able to be

totality of circumstances gave rise to a reasonable

prosecuted for his conduct. And based on those facts

6

belief that the defendant was intoxicated and that he

6

and that conclusion, the prosecutor authorized a

7

had been driving while under the influence of

7

warrantless blood draw, and as you heard from

8

alcohol. Corporal Sly testified that he had slurred

Corporal Sly that blood draw was performed in a

speech, there was a strong odor of alcohol and that
10

he was combative when it was suggested that he may

reasonable manner, standard, nothing remarkable about
10

it.
And therefore based on McNeely, it's

11

have been driving while under the influence of

11

12

alcohol. And additionally, the defendant refused to

12

reliance on Schmerber and the totality of

13

consent to the standardized field sobriety test, to

13

circumstances if the instant case, the exigent

14

the breath analysis standard test and after he was

14

circumstances exception did apply, no warrant was

15

transported to the jail and arrested for being under

15

needed in this instance, and the state's inability to

16

the influence of alcohol while driving a vehicle.

16

obtain one contributed to the exigency of the

17

circumstances.

17

We also heard from prosecutor Scott

Now, finally, your Honor, of course the

18

Bandy that the State did it's best to obtain a

18

19

warrant from the on-call judge but the on-call judge

19

consent exception to the warrant requirement remains.

20

did not answer or respond to multiple phone calls

20

And based on the Idaho State Supreme Court's ruling

21

that were made that evening.

21

in Diaz and cases since then, we understand that the

22

18-8002(1) implied consent requirement is the law in

22

Based on all of the facts that were

23

before the on-call prosecutor and Corporal Sly that

23

Idaho, and based on that case and its prodigy, the

24

evening, the totality of the circumstances suggested

24

defendant by driving in the State of Idaho on Idaho

25

that there were exigent circumstances and that

25

roads offered his consent to the blood draw and

I
I

I
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I

therefore the consent exception to the warrant
3

2

the Solicitor General for the United States concedes

Thank you.

3

that implied consent is an insufficient trump to the

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Deaton.
MR. DEATON: Thank you, your Honor.

Fourth Amendment. McNeely talks about implied
consent being a valid statute when it comes to civil

I will borrow the prosecutor's
7

penalties related to refusals. It says, Hey, look,

structure as to the two exceptions they're seeking.

7

I'm going to begin first with consent.

license is a privilege, not a right.

10

have struggled with what Diaz means in the light of

10

11

McNeely. McNeely does not address on point implied

11

from the Missouri Supreme Court, as well as the

12

concept statutes, it refers in passing to those.

12

concession by the Solicitor General, as well as just

13

I think that is significant for two

13

basic hierarchies of governance is that a

reasons. The first is McNeely is an appeal from the

14

constitutional right, a Fourth Amendment right,

15

Missouri Supreme Court. If you look at the

15

cannot be stripped by a civil statute in a state.

16

underlying Missouri Supreme Court decision in

16

17

McNeely, the Missouri Supreme Court found that the

17

Amendment applies to blood draws, that there is not a

18

implied consent statute in Missouri was insufficient

18

per se exigency.

19

to justify, to trump, the Fourth Amendment rights of

19

One of the arguments that I heard --

20

defendant. That's in the state Supreme Court

20

well I will save that for the exigent circumstances.

holding. It was not assigned as error by the

21

It is clear in this case there is no evidence in the

22

appealing attorney general to the US Supreme Court.

22

record, and I think the evidence is to the contrary,

23

Which is one of the reasons why the US Supreme Court

23

that my client never consented, gave an actual

24

didn't bring it up, because it was never assigned as
error.

24

25

consent to either a field sobriety test or actual
consent to the blood draw, which means the state is

25

33

34

relying on this implied consent, which is Diaz.
I think that for the reasons I
3

previously stated, given the procedural history in

draws, that is the province of the judicial branch,
2

it is the province of your Honor and the other judges

3

elected and appointed in this state. It is not on

I
I
I

prosecuting attorneys.

rights cannot be stripped by state statutes, that
7

I

McNeely is clear that the Fourth

21

I

I

But I think that the procedural history

14

McNeely as well as the fact that constitutional

I
I

if you're going to refuse, you can take a driver's
license, and that's significant because a driver's

I think admittedly most of the judges in this state

I

I

Secondly, the Amicus brief submitted by

requirement also applies in this case.

The second point I wanted to make is

there was no implied consent sufficient to justify

that madam prosecutor indicated that if they hadn't

withdrawing blood without a warrant.

authorized a blood draw, somebody could get away with

I'll turn my argument next to the

a DUI. My first response with that is well, we have

exigent circumstances. To my mind the trooper

to comply with the constitution in this country. The

10

articulated several facts which he observed which

10

11

might have led him to believe that my client was

11

If Officer Sly's observation of impairment are

12

under the influence of alcohol, but prosecutor Bandy

12

sufficiently compelling to a jury, the jury could

13

stated one of the reasons he thought there was an

13

find that person guilty.

14

exigent circumstance is the natural dissipation of

14

15

alcohol. That was his testimony.

15

somebody get off scott-free or not, the statute

16

allows a prosecution, either based on performance of

16

First of all, I don't know that his

second is they can still try on an impairment theory.

This isn't a choice of do we just let

17

opinion is all that relevant because -- I think this

17

an evidentiary test coming back over a certain level

18

case presents a conundrum for this court where

18

or an on impairment theory. Officer Sly can take the

19

essentially the prosecutor made an attempt to contact

19

stand in front of the jury and say here is the facts

20

the judge, several attempts, three to five by his

20

that I observed. So this isn't a question before,

21

testimony, but then he just authorized the blood

21

your Honor, about whether we are going to let

22

draw. And if we're going to allow prosecuting

22

somebody get away with a DUI, it's what evidence does

23

attorneys to make good faith attempts -- I'm not

23

that jury get to hear. And that evidence should be

24

saying there was anything but a good faith attempt--

24

and is circumscribed by the Fourth Amendment of the

25

but if that's unsuccessful to just authorize blood

25

constitution.
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There were no exigent circumstances in
2

this case. If this court is to determine that the

3

inability of the prosecution to obtain a warrant by

I
I
I
I

this court today was we saw a lot of signs they were
intoxicated and time was a wasting. And McNeely says
3

contacting a judge justifies exigent circumstances, I

that that is not the proper analysis, that you have
to have something more than just time.

think that, (a), that is an improper factor to

My final argument has to do with

6

consider. Exigent circumstance has to do with the

retrograde extrapolation, which the prosecutor said

7

factors of the case, of the officer and the

the Supreme Court kind of used as a catchall to

defendant.

8

justify their ruling. In the State of Idaho the

Prosecute Bandy said well one of the

legislature has determined that retrograde

10

reason was natural dissipation of alcohol. McNeely

10

extrapolation will not be permitted in Idaho.

11

makes it clear that that cannot be one of the exigent

11

don't know how more protections provided to a

12

circumstances. The prosecutor in her argument said,

12

defendant by a state legislature would somehow

13

well, one of the exigent circumstances is we couldn't

13

overrule the ruling in McNeely.

14

get a warrant. I don't think that is a proper

14

15

factor.

15

We have a case here where there was no
warrant. The officer testified he thought he needed

16

The exigent circumstances has to do

16

a warrant. I think everybody agrees that absent an

17

with whether or not the defendant is intentionally

17

exception, a warrant was required here. The

18

delaying the process, it as to do with other factors

18

justification for the two exceptions to the search

19

about Schmerber which the prosecutor cites whether

19

warrant are invalid here. They don't have actual

20

there's going to be a medical examination, whether

20

consent. I think implied consent is implicitly

21

this person is going to have the opportunity to make

21

overruled by McNeely and there were not exigent

22

an arrest or whether there's going to be subsequent

22

circumstances in this case.

23

hospitalization of those items. And none of those

23

24

factors are present.

24

somewhat troubled or cautious in allowing prosecutors

25

to make good faith attempts but then to unilaterally

25

To my mind what has been argued before

And I think the court should be

37

38

authorize search warrants. That is dangerous if

nothing in an attempt to abuse the constitutional

prosecutors can unilaterally authorizing warrants if

rights of the defendant, rather they did their best

they can't get in front of a judge.

given the circumstances.
Now, your Honor, there are exigent

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Deaton. You're

circumstances here. I think that defense counsel

looking like you want to speak again.
7

I
I
I

36

used the phrase -- he referred to Schmerber and said

MS. SIMMONS: I sure would.

7

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.
MS. SIMMONS: I'll begin with where defense

8

that the exigent circumstances exception can exist
where a defendant intentionally delays the process.
That is precisely what occurred in this

10

counsel closed his argument, your Honor. Prosecutors

10

case. The defendant refused to participate in the

11

and law enforcement often unilaterally -- not often

11

field sobriety tests, refused to offer his breath

12

but sometimes have cause to and must unilaterally

12

alcohol concentration, to submit to that test. How

13

authorize searches, and that the very reason that we

13

could the state possibly have proceeded with an

14

have exigent circumstance exception, consent

14

impairment theory for DUI in this case? He refused

15

exceptions and so on to the requirement of a warrant.

15

to participate on any level and did everything that

16

he could to obstruct the investigation of the state.

16

Certainly in ideal circumstances a

17

judge will always be available and timely available

17

18

to issue a warrant. However, of course these

18

19

exceptions to the requirement of a warrant exist and

19

prevent the state from gathering evidence and the

20

in this case the good faith efforts of the prosecutor

20

state invested its good-faith efforts into properly

21

to obtain a warrant and of the law enforcement

21

obtaining a warrant from the judge and -- excuse

22

officer, as defense counsel has characterized, they

22

me -- the state invested its good-faith efforts to

23

were good-faith efforts.

23

that end, was unavailable, unsuccessful in obtaining

24

a warrant from the judge, and based on the

25

defendant's refusal to perform the standardized field

24
25

There is no mal intent here.
Prosecution and law enforcement did absolutely

Now, your Honor, if there are not -- he
did everything he could to delay that process to

39
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40

sobriety test, physical manifestations of
2

attempted to obtain a warrant, in that case they

intoxication, his intentional delays of the process

didn't even try to -- and the Supreme Court in

and the state's inability to obtain a warrant, an

3

exigent circumstance arose.

concluded they had acted properly.

Now, if we were to say that in every
6

The delay necessary to obtain a warrant

instance similar to this one that a warrant must be

under the circumstances threatened the destruction of

acquired, then what is exigent circumstances? And

evidence, the state thus acted under the exigent

I'll refer, your Honor, once again to Schmerber --

circumstances exception to the warrant requirement,

actually to Missouri v. McNeely. This is what I
10
11

and the United States Supreme Court concluded both in

quoted to you before, your Honor. Citing to
Schmerber, the court in Schmerber concluded that:
"The warrantless blood test was

12

11

Schmerber and again in McNeely that such conduct was
permissible and that the defendant's constitutional

12

right were not violated.

10

13

nonetheless permissible because the officer

13

14

might reasonably have believed that he was

14

15

confronted with an emergency in which the

15

16

delay necessary to obtain a warrant under the

16

17

circumstances threatened destruction of

17

18

evidence." That is at 133 S.Ct. 1560.

18

Now, your Honor, that sentence could be

19

19

I

I

THE COURT: Are you getting ready to say
something more?

MR. DEATON: No. No.
THE COURT: I want to give everyone a fair
opportunity.

placed into a conversation about this case precisely.

20

21

In this case the warrantless blood test was

21

arguments. I don't think McNeely goes as far as the

22

permissible because the officer and the prosecutor,

22

state would like to think it goes. However, I am

23

two individuals, not just one, reasonably believed

23

going to rule on the second prong, and I do believe

24

that they were confronted with an emergency in which

24

there were exigent circumstances here. I'm going to

25

the delay necessary to obtain a warrant -- they

25

deny the motion to suppress and let me make somewhat

All right. I appreciate your

42
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And, your Honor, the same is true in
this case. Thank you.

20

of a record here.

I

Schmerber and again in 2013 in Missouri v. McNeely,

McNeely appears to rule that there is

there are ways to get a quick answer from a judge to
2

get a quick search warrant, and Ada County in

no implied consent anymore. I do think it's still an

response to that set up a process for it and it's a

open question as to whether McNeely does in fact

process that works I think 99 percent of the time.

overrule Diaz, and I think Diaz remains good law

Unfortunately it didn't work in this

until the Supreme Court tells us differently.

instance and Mr. Bandy didn't have a lot of choices,

However, I'm uncomfortable ruling on

7

and he instructed Corporal Sly to take the blood,

that prong in today's case, and I don't need to

which is a call I think Mr. Bandy can make, and he

because I feel pretty strongly about the

does so at his peril. But prosecutors are asked to

10

extrapolation -- I'm sorry, about the exigent

10

make those kind of calls all the time. They're

11

circumstances. There is clearly no extrapolation in

11

called to find out if officers can break down the

12

Idaho, which means it doesn't take as much to get to

12

door and officers are told yes or no. So I don't

13

exigency.

13

fault Mr. Bandy for how he handled it, I do think he

14

has the authority and he did not usurp the judge's

say his name -- the defendant did delay the process.

15

authority. And so that's my ruling.

16

And as Mr. Deaton put forth, Mr. Bandy made

16

17

good-faith attempts to follow the procedure set forth

17

18

in Ada County to get a search warrant. At 11:00 p.m.

18

19

there is only one on-call judge, and even if

19

20

Mr. Bandy were to call another judge and get that

20

21

judge up, that judge isn't really situated to hear

21

from your Honor's statement, but I want to be clear

22

probable cause because the one digital recorder we

22

that in the calculation, the determination of exigent

23

have is with the on-call judge. So it's kind of a

23

circumstances, your Honor is taking into account

24

pickle when you can't reach the on-call judge.

24

whether or not a judge -- not whether a process is

25

available but how that process is carried out and

14
15

25

In this case Mr. Chernobieff -- I can't

What McNeely said was in a modern age

Any questions? Do you want to make a
clearer record in any way?

MR.DEATON: I do. I would like it clarify
the ruling.
So, your Honor -- I think it's clear

44
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THE COURT: Because time was of the essence.
MR. DEATON: That leads to my second

whether a judge is actually available; is that
correct.
3

6

THE COURT: I'm not sure I'm understanding

3

question. The court is finding that there was a

your question, but if I am understanding it correctly

delay in the process --

then yes. I think that in Mr. Bandy did not make a

THE COURT: I'm saying that he couldn't have
waited until morning to get a search warrant because

good-faith efforts to reach a judge, there would be a
different -- it would be a different question. But

7

in this case because he did and there was no back up

the blood does dissipate, it would have been useless.
So as McNeely stated, there are time factors.
1

MR. DEATON: l m clarifying the court's

process to get a different judge, he appears to have
10

done all he could to get a judge's permission to take

10

ruling that my client delayed the process. By not

11

the blood in a timely fashion.

11

participating in the field sobriety test, didn't he

12

speed up that process.

12

MR. DEATON: Understood. So the court's

THE COURT: All I'm saying is he wasn't

13

ruling is that because there was good-faith attempts,

13

14

there was no other alternative, that a warrant is not

14

cooperating. Because he didn't cooperate, that

15

required?

15

triggered another set of events. There may or may

16

THE COURT: Yes. And I'm not getting to the

16

not have been a time delay, but he forced

17

first prong, I'm side-stepping the first prong by

17

Corporal Sly to seek the warrant because he didn't

18

ruling in the state's favor on the second prong.

18

cooperate.

19

MR. DEATON: I understand that, and I just

19

MR. DEATON: Is the court ruling that my

20

want to make sure it's clear for the record as to

20

client didn't not have the right to refuse the field

21

appeal that the court is saying that because the

21

sobriety test?

22

prosecutor acted in good faith, they don't have to

22

23

get a warrant.

23

THE COURT: No.
MR. DEATON: I think I've clarified the
court's ruling.
THE COURT: Ms. Simmons, anything?

24
25

THE COURT: That's right.
MR. DEATON: The second --

24
25
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MS. SIMMONS: No, your Honor.
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THE COURT: Okay. That's it. Thank you -3

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIBER

well, how do you want to proceed from here? Set it
for another pretrial or can we pre-try it now?

5
6

I, Christie Valcich, do hereby certify that

MR. DEATON: We can pre-try it now. I've

the foregoing transcript ls a true and correct

got to talk to my client about the trial. I

record of the recorded proceedings; that said

anticipate I'll want to file a motion to reconsider

proceedings were transcribed to the best of my
ability from the audio recording as provided;

based on this.
9

(Proceedings concluded.)
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10

10

nor employed by any of the parties to this case

11
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ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: JACOB D. DEATON
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: CHRISTOPHER C. MCCURDY
Daniel Chernobieff appeals from the decision of the magistrate denying his
motion to suppress. Chernobieff pied guilty to driving under the influence conditioned
upon his ability to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The defendant was stopped on September 11, 2013, by Trooper Ben Comorosky
of the Idaho State Police. Following a DUI investigation, the officer arrested the
defendant and took him to the Ada County Jail. The trooper contacted Ada County
Prosecuting Attorney Scott Bandy to prepare a request for a search warrant. The
prosecutor could not reach the on-call judge. Instead of waiting to receive a warrant, the
officer had the defendant's blood drawn by a phlebotomist. The test results indicated the
OPINiON ON APPEAL-1
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defendant had a blood alcohol content of .226. The defendant moved to suppress the
evidence obtained in the blood draw. The magistrate denied the motion and this appeal
was taken following a conditional guilty plea, reserving the defendant's right to appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving
a trial de nova), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court.
State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of

law or statute is a question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. Miller,
134 Idaho 458, 462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000). "At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence,
and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646,
648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 (Ct. App. 2007).
"When reviewing 'seizure' issues, we defer to the trial court's factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. 1 We freely review, de nova, the trial court's legal
determination of whether or not an illegal seizure occurred." State v. Schwarz, 133
Idaho 463,466, 988 P.2d 689, 692 (1999).
SUPPRESSION

The defendant contends his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because his
blood was involuntarily drawn without a warrant after he refused to submit to a
breathalyzer,

and the State failed to demonstrate the existence of exigent

circumstances that would justify an exception to the general rule that the Fourth

1

See a/so State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234, 127 P.3d 133, 137 (2005) ("The Court accepts the trial
court's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence.").
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Amendment requires that the state obtain a warrant before conducting searches and
seizures.
During the suppression hearing, Corporal Matthew Sly testified that he assisted
Trooper Comorosky with a traffic stop involving the defendant on the interstate on
September 11, 2013. After the initial investigation indicated that the defendant was
driving under the influence, Corporal Sly placed him under arrest. Chernobieff twice
refused a breath test.
Corporal Sly testified that he then "needed to obtain a search warrant for a blood
sample, and so ... I was going to try to contact the judge to set up a conference call in
order to obtain a search warrant for a blood sample." February 4, 2014 Hearing
Transcript. It was apparently close to midnight. The officer made a call while he was at
the site and talked to the on-call prosecutor to let him know what was going on. The
prosecutor attempted to contact the on-call judge but, after trying for five or ten minutes,
he was unable to do so. Officer Sly testified that the prosecutor told him "to go ahead
and take blood due to exigent circumstance" and he did so. Id., at 16-17.
The prosecutor also testified and confirmed that he attempted to contact the oncall magistrate but was unable to do so, after making three to five attempts to do so. "At
that point I informed Trooper Sly that we had made substantial efforts to try and contact
the on-call magistrate and that based on our inability to get in touch with him, that we
would then default back to exigent circumstances that would provide an exception to the
warrant requirement due to the unavailability of securing a warrant in a timely fashion."
Id., at 24.
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The state argued initially that Corporal Sly was authorized to undertake the blood
draw because of Idaho's implied consent law and because of exigent circumstances.
However, in light of U.S. and State Supreme Court cases the state has abandoned the
implied consent argument.
The magistrate was reluctant to address the implied consent issue because of
the uncertainty surrounding the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Missouri v.
McNeely, _U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013). The magistrate stated:

... I do believe there were exigent circumstances here. I'm going to deny
the motion to suppress and let me make somewhat of a record here.
McNeely appears to rule that there is no implied consent anymore. I do
think it's still an open question as to whether McNeely does in fact
overrule Diaz, and I think Diaz remains good law until the [Idaho] Supreme
Court tells us differently.

However, I'm uncomfortable ruling on that prong in today's case, and I
don't need to because I feel pretty strongly about the . . . exigent
circumstances ...
the defendant did delay t~e process . . . Mr. Bandy made good-faith
attempts to follow the procedure set forth in Ada County to get a search
warrant. At 11 :00 p.m. there is only one on-call judge, and even if Mr.
Bandy were to call another judge and get that judge up, that judge isn't
really situated to hear probable cause because the one digital recorder we
have is with the on-call judge. So it's kind of a pickle when you can't reach
the on-call judge.
What McNeely said was in a modern age there are ways to get a quick
answer from a judge to get a quick search warrant, and Ada County in
response to that set up a process for it and it's a process that works I think
99 percent of the time.
Unfortunately it didn't work in this instance and Mr. Bandy didn't have a lot
of choices, and he instructed Corporal Sly to take the blood, which is a call
I think Mr. Bandy can make, and he does so at his peril. But prosecutors
are asked to make those kind of calls all the time ... So I don't fault Mr.
Bandy for how he handled it ... And so that's my ruling.
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At the time of his decision, as noted by the magistrate, State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho
300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007) had not been expressly overruled by the
Idaho Supreme Court. In the intervening time, it has been expressly overruled. See
State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575, 580-82 (2014) ("[l]mplied consent is no

longer acceptable when it operates as a per se exception to the warrant requirement .. .
we read McNeely as prohibiting all per se exceptions to the warrant requirement .. .
Idaho's implied consent statute is an unconstitutional per se exception to the warrant
requirement."). See also State v. Halseth, _P.3d _ , 2014 WL 6756312, *4 (Id.)
C'[W]e hold that an implied consent statute such as . . . Idaho's does not justify a
warrantless blood draw from a driver who refuses to consent .... "). Also, State v.
Arrota, 2014 Opinion No. 137 filed December 18, 2014.
McNeely holds that "[i]n those drunk-driving investigations where police officers

can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without
significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates
that they do so." 133 S.Ct. at 1561. In other words, there is no per se exigency
exception to the warrant requirement because of the dissipation of blood alcohol
evidence. See McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1563 ("[W]hile the natural dissipation of alcohol in
the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific case . . . it does not do so
categorically."). The Idaho Supreme Court cases conform to the letter and spirit of the
U.S. Supreme Court decision. That leaves open the case-by-case analysis of whether
there are exigent circumstances that justify a warrantless search. The magistrate found
that there were such exigent circumstances in this case. Considerations which the
magistrate articulated included a determination that the defendant delayed the process
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by refusing to take field sobriety tests, the events occurred at 11 :00 p.m., the prosecutor
made a good faith effort to obtain a warrant through the process of an on-call judge who
could not be reached, and there was no systei:n in place to go to a backup judge. Those
findings are supported by the record. Whether they rise to the level of exigency is the
question. The lynch pin of that decision revolves around the failed attempt to obtain a
warrant through the system in place for an on-call magistrate. By themselves the
lateness of the hour and the refusals to take field sobriety tests would not constitute
exigent circumstances. They are likely common conditions. They may be weighed in the
totality of the circumstances. Similarly, the change in blood alcohol level as time passes
is a natural occurrence that an expeditious process seeks to limit. The final link to
establish exigent circumstances is whether the failure within the judicial system can be
weighed. See McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1562-63 ("[l]mprovements in communications
technology do not guarantee that a magistrate judge will be available when an officer
needs a warrant after making a late-night arrest . . . exigent circumstances justifying a
warrantless blood sample may arise in the regular course of law enforcement due to
delays from the warrant application process . . . Whether a warrantless blood test of a
drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the
totality of the circumstances."). See also February 4, 2014 Hearing Transcript, at 41: "At
11 :00 p.m. there is only one on-call judge, and even if Mr. Bandy were to call another
judge and get that judge up, that judge isn't really situated to hear probable cause
because the one digital recorder we have is with the on-call judge. So it's kind of a
pickle when you can't reach the on-call judge." This is a problem one might expect more
in a small county rather than in Ada County. In any event, the determination of exigent
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circumstances made by the magistrate is supported by the record. However, and this is
a very weighty however, this breakdown has been exposed and can be addressed by a
redundancy system, at least where multiple judges are available. The logic of the old
, adage that every dog gets one bite is applicable in this realm. It is very likely that a
failure in the judicial process in the future will not weigh as an exigency unless that
failure is tied to a failure of equipment or some other factor not controllable in the court
system itself.
CONCLUSION

The magistrate's decision denying the defendant's motion to suppress is
affirmed.

Dated this

5:f.._ day of February 2015.

~
Senior District Judge
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DECLARATION OF DANIEL CHERNOBIEFF
DANIEL CHERNOBIEFF, hereby declares under penalty of perjury as follows:
1) I am the petitioner in this action.
2) If the motion to suppress would have been granted, I would not have pled guilty to
DUI- Excessive.
3) If the motion to suppress would have been granted, I would not have pled guilty to
DUI and instead would have gone to trial.
I cert ify or declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Idaho
that the foregoing is true and correct, and that I am physically located outside the
geographical boundaries of the United States, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin
Islands, and any territory or insular possession subject to t he jurisdiction of the
United States. By signing this declaration I am submitting myself to the jurisdiction
of the State of Idaho for purposes of enforcing the penalty of perjury as it relates to
this declaration.
Executed on the 7th day of December, at Bagram, Afghanistan,
DANIEL CHEROBIEFF
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Electronically Filed
8/22/2018 8:00 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Austen Joseph, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Shelley W. Akamatsu
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Suite 3191
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
DANIEL CHERNOBIEFF,
Petitioner,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 0117 22652
ANSWER TO PETITION

)

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Respondent.

)

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Shelley W. Akamatsu, Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney and does answer the petition of Chernobieffs petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906( c).
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I.
Admissions
The respondent admits paragraphs 1-7 in the petition.
Denials
The respondent denies paragraphs 8-10 in the petition and all the claims contained
in Chemobieffs petition to the extent they are factual.

DATED this - - ~ - \ day of

Q,L'1? &i 2018.
1

s~~Ml.l~ ~l ~
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

~

day of

~ t!,Cf

2018, I caused a

true and corr ct copy of the foregoing to be placed in Odyssey email, addressed to:
Greg Silvey: greg@idahoappeals.com
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Filed: 12/18/2018 10:19:42
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Welch, Cortni

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Tamera Kelly
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 8039
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
DANIEL CHERNOBIEFF,

)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
)
vs.
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
Respondent.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

Case No. CV0l-17-22652
ORDER FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

THIS COURT, having reviewed the State's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the
Court being fully advised in the premises;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's Motion is granted.

DATED - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Signed: 12/13/2018 10:06 AM

~t.d

Judge

ORDER FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (CHERNOBIEFF) Page 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on

signed: 1211812018 10:19 AM

,

I served the foregoing document upon

the following attorneys, persons and agencies at the addresses listed below.
Greg Silvey
PO Box 5501
Boise, ID 83 705

[
[
[

] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
] Facsimile
] Email
[ ✓] greg@idahoappeals.com

Tamera Kelly
200 W. Front Street Room 3191
Boise, ID 83 702

[
[
[✓

] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
] Facsimile
] acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Ada County Clerk of the Court

Deputy Clerk

ORDER FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (CHERNOBIEFF) Page 2

Filed: 01/29/2019 11:33:18
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Boucher, Sherri
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
DANIEL CHERNOBIEFF

)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
Respondent.
)
____________________________________)

CASE NO. CV 01-2017-22652

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Judgment for Respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this ____ day of January, 2018.
Signed: 1/29/2019 11:31 AM

_________________________________
Daniel Steckel
Magistrate Judge
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Electronically Filed
1/29/2019 11 :26 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Austen Joseph, Deputy Clerk

SILVEY LAW OFFICE LTD
Greg S. Silvey, Attorney at Law
ISB # 5139
P.O. Box 5501
Boise, Idaho 83705
(208) 286-7 400
greg@idahoappeals.com
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
DANIEL CHERNOBIEFF,
Petitioner/Appellant,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

_________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Ada Co. No. CV-01-17-22652
NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND
THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR, 200 FRONT ST.
BOISE, IDAHO, ID 83702, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The

above-named

appellant

appeals

against

the

above-named

respondent from the Magistrate Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State
of Idaho to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
from the Order for Summary Judgment entered December 18, 2018, to be
followed by a final judgment, the Honorable Daniel Steckel, presiding.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 1

2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho District Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders
under and pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 83(a)(2)(B).
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then

intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall
not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal, is:
(a)

Whether the magistrate

court erred in summarily dismissing the

petition for post conviction relief.

This issue comprises matters of

both fact and law.
4.

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(d)5), the proceedings were recorded and the

recording is in the possession of the transcript department of the Ada County
Court.

Appellant requests the preparation of

the reporter's transcript of the

following hearing:
(a)
6.

Scheduling conference held December 3, 2018;

I certify:
(a)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served;

(b)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the transcript will be paid

within 14 days;
(c)

That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a postconviction case;
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DATED this

29th day of January, 2019.

Isl Greg S. Silvey
GREG S. SILVEY
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29 th day of January, 2019, I caused a
true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading to be served via the file and
serve system to the email identified as the party's service contact:
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
200 West Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
acpocourtdocs@ada.web.net
Ada County Court Transcript Department via email to:
transcripts@adaweb.net

Isl Greg S. Silvey
Greg S. Silvey
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Electronically Filed
1/29/2019 1:19 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Austen Joseph, Deputy Clerk

SILVEY LAW OFFICE LTD
Greg S. Silvey, Attorney at Law
ISB # 5139
P.O. Box 5501
Boise, Idaho 83705
(208) 286-7 400
greg@idahoappeals.com
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
DANIEL CHERNOBIEFF,
Petitioner/Appellant,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

_________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Ada Co. No. CV-01-17-22652
AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND
THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR, 200 FRONT ST.
BOISE, IDAHO, ID 83702, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The

above-named

appellant

appeals

against

the

above-named

respondent from the Magistrate Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State
of Idaho to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
from the Order for Summary Judgment entered December 18, 2018, and the
Judgment entered January 29, 2019, the Honorable Daniel Steckel, presiding.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 1

2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho District Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders
under and pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 83(a)(2)(8).
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then

intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall
not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal, is:
(a)

Whether the magistrate

court erred in summarily dismissing the

petition for post conviction relief.

This issue comprises matters of

both fact and law.
4.

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(d)5), the proceedings were recorded and the

recording is in the possession of the transcript department of the Ada County
Court.

Appellant requests the preparation of

the reporter's transcript of the

following hearing:
(a)
6.

Scheduling conference held December 3, 2018;

I certify:
(a)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served;

(b)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the transcript will be paid

within 14 days;
(c)

That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a postconviction case;
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DATED this

29th day of January, 2019.

Isl Greg S. Silvey
GREG S. SILVEY
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29 th day of January, 2019, I caused a
true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading to be served via the file and
serve system to the email identified as the party's service contact:
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
200 West Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
acpocourtdocs@ada.web.net
Ada County Court Transcript Department via email to:
transcripts@adaweb.net

Isl Greg S. Silvey
Greg S. Silvey
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Filed: 07/22/2019 16:13:39
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Lyke, Martha

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

DANIEL CHERNOBIEFF,
Petitioner-Appellant,

Case No. CV01-17-22652

vs.

OPINION ON APPEAL

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: GREG S. SILVEY
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: BRANDOM BECKHAM

I. NATURE OF THE CASE
The petitioner appeals the decision of the magistrate granting summary dismissal
of his
petition seeking post-conviction relief.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following is taken from the Court's opinion on the direct appeal in the underly
ing
criminal case:
The Defendant was stopped on September 11, 2013 by Trooper Ben
Comorosky of the Idaho State Police. Following a DUI investigation, the officer
arrested the Defendant and took him to the Ada County Jail. The trooper
contacted Ada County Prosecuting Attorney Scott Bandy to prepare a request
for a search warrant. That prosecutor could not reach the on-call judge. Instead
of waiting to receive a warrant, the officer had the defendant's blood drawn by a
phlebotomist. The test results indicated the defendant had a blood alcohol
content of .226. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the
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blood draw. The magistrate denied the motion[.] February 11, 2015 Opinion on
Appeal at 1-2.
This Court's opinion on direct appeal was affirmed by both the Idaho Court of Appeals
and the Idaho Supreme Court. See State v. Chemobieff, 2016 WL 1708538 (Id. Ct. App.). See
also State v. Chemobieff, 161 Idaho 537, 387 P.3d 790 (2018).

The appellant subsequently filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, on the basis
that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. His petition was summarily dismissed
by the magistrate.
Ill. ISSUE ON APPEAL

The appellant asserts the court erred in summarily dismissing the petition for postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving a trial
de nova), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. Kenner,
121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of law or statute is a
question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 458, 462, 4
P.3d 570 , 574 (Ct. App. 2000) .
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than criminal,
proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Like plaintiffs in
other civil actions, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence the
allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. A petition
for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action,
however, in that it must contain more than "a short and plain statement of the
claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1 ). The petition must
be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner,
and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be
attached, or the petition must state why such supporting evidence is not
included . In other words, the petition must present or be accompanied by
admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or it will be subject to dismissal.
Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791, 795-96, 291 P.3d 474, 478-79 (Ct. App. 2012).
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Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for
post-conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's
own initiative, if "it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of facts, together with any
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.C. § 19-4906(c). When
considering summary dismissal, the district court must construe disputed facts in
the petitioner's favor, but the court is not required to accept either the petitioner's
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the
petitioner's conclusions of law. Moreover, because the district court rather than a
jury will be the trier of fact in the event of an evidentiary hearing, the district court
is not constrained to draw inferences in the petitioner's favor, but is free to arrive
at the most probable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Such inferences
will not be disturbed on appeal if the uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to
justify them. 153 Idaho at 796, 291 P.3d at 479.
Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly
disproven by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not
presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of
the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do not justify relief as a matter of law.
Thus, summary dismissal of a claim for post-conviction relief is appropriate when
the court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief even with all disputed facts construed in the petitioner's favor. For this
reason, summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition may be appropriate
even when the State does not controvert the petitioner's evidence. Id.
"Conversely, if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege
facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not be
summarily dismissed. If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing
must be conducted to resolve the factual issues." 153 Idaho at 796-97, 291 P.3d at 479-80.
"On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized
by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner's admissible evidence asserts facts
which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Over questions of law, we exercise free
review." 153 Idaho at 797, 291 P.3d at 480.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must
show that his attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was
prejudiced by the deficiency. To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the
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burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Id.
The prejudice component is so significant that a court is not required to analyze
whether a trial counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice aspect. In
addressing the prejudice component of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
Supreme Court of the United States made the following observation:
Although we have discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness
claim prior to the prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding an
ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to
address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient
showing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel's
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an
ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's performance. If it is easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,
which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed. Courts should
strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to
defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
When evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Court does not secondguess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for postconviction relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Payne, 146
Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136. "There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell
within the wide range of professional assistance." State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 511, 988
P.2d 1170, 1185 (1999) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,
760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988)).
The defendant also must overcome a strong presumption "that counsel made all
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment."
Cullen v. Pinholster, _U.S._ , 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1407, 179 L.Ed.2d 557, 579
(2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at
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695)). "A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct
from counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at
2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694. Thus, strategic decisions are "virtually
unchallengeable" if made after a "thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options." Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695.
Decisions "made after less than complete investigation" are still reasonable to
the extent "reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on
investigation." Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695. Counsel is
permitted to develop a strategy. Richter, 562 U.S. at 107, 131 S.Ct. at 789, 178
L.Ed.2d at 644.
The petitioner pied guilty to the DUI charge, reserving his right to appeal the denial of
his suppression motion:
Where, as here, the petitioner was convicted upon a guilty plea, to satisfy the
prejudice element, the petitioner must show there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would not have pied guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial. Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762, 152 P.3d 629,
633 (Ct. App . 2006). This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical
or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal
unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v.
State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994). Boren v. State,
2016 WL 556364, *3 (Id . Ct. App.).
V. ANALYSIS

The petitioner asserts trial counsel was ineffective because he objected to the
introduction of evidence at the suppression hearing concerning the reason why the prosecutor
was unable to reach the on-call magistrate when the State was trying to reach him to obtain a
warrant for a blood draw, after the appellant had refused to undergo field sobriety and breath
testing:
The on-call prosecutor from that night (Scott Bandy) testified at the hearing. His
testimony was substantially the same as the police officer's about attempting to
contact the on-call magistrate. The prosecutor testified that he called the on-call
magistrate, Judge Mike Oths, at the judge's personal cell phone number, which
is the judge's preferred method of contact. (Tr. p. 23.) The prosecutor called that
number and received no response and called it again to check he had dialed
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right. He had, and left a voicemail requesting a return call and that it was for a
blood draw search warrant. (T. p. 23.) All told, the prosecutor called a certain
three times and perhaps five, and left a voicemail, maybe two. (Tr. p. 23-24.)
The on-call prosecutor then testified that the next day he conferred with the
magistrate and found that the ringer was off on his cell phone. (Tr. p. 24).
Defense counsel objected and moved to strike this evidence, and the court
sustained the objection. (Id.)
The on-duty prosecutor then testified:
At that point I informed Trooper Sly that we had made substantial
efforts to try and contact the on-call magistrate and that based on
our inability to get in touch with him, that would provide an
exception to the warrant requirement due to the unavailability of
securing a warrant in a timely fashion . (Tr. p. 24). Verified Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief at 8-9.
The petitioner relies heavily on this paragraph from the Idaho Supreme Court's decision
on his direct appeal:
The district court's observation regarding the inability to contact the on-call
magistrate, particularly in Ada County where there are a number of magistrate
judges, does raise some concern. The State has an obligation to provide a
functional and reliable system for obtaining warrants in circumstances like these,
both during regular office hours and through the night and on weekends. When
an on-call magistrate is unable to be reached by law enforcement. the State has
the burden of showing why that is the case and that good cause exists for the
unavailability. Here the State sought to present evidence as to the reason for the
magistrate's unavailability, but defense counsel objected and the evidence was
stricken from the record . With no such evidence in the record, the Court
presumes that the trial court ruled correctly. State v. Chernobieff, 161 Idaho 537,
541, 387 P.3d 790, 794 (2016). (Emphasis added.)
The appellant submitted the transcript of the suppression hearing as an exhibit. The
relevant part of the transcript is where the on-call prosecutor was testifying concerning his
efforts to contact the on-call magistrate: "And I can tell you for sure it was three, it could have
been five [times that he attempted to call him]. It's early morning. I did leave at least one voice
mail, maybe two. I did confer with Judge Mike Oths the next day and found that his ringer was
off on his cell phone." February 4, 2014 Hearing Transcript at 24.
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Trial counsel for the appellant then stated: "Objection, move to strike that as hearsay,
speculation." Id.
The magistrate ruled: "Well, I don't think it's relevant. I don't know that be it's - I'll
sustain the objection. Took me awhile to get there. Go ahead." Id.
A review of the remainder of the hearing transcript reveals that trial counsel focused his
witness examination and argument on the basis that there were not exigent circumstances
present to justify obtaining a warrantless blood draw of the appellant and that the State's
inability to contact a magistrate to secure a warrant should not suffice to show such exigent
circumstances. See id. at 3-45. 1 See also id. at 33 ("I think this case presents a conundrum for
this court where essentially the prosecutor made an attempt to contact the judge, several
attempts, three to five by the testimony, but then he just authorized the blood draw. And if
we're going to allow prosecuting attorneys to make good faith attempts - I'm not saying there
was anything but a good faith attempt - but if that's unsuccessful to just authorize blood
draws[.]"
When evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Court does not secondguess strategic and tactical decisions. Such decisions cannot serve as a basis for postconviction relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. The appellant
must also overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within the wide
range of professional assistance.

1

See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1562-63, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ("[l]mprovements in
communications technology do not guarantee that a magistrate judge will be available when an officer needs a
warrant after making a late-night arrest ... exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood sample may
arise in the regular course of law enforcement due to delays from the warrant application process ... Whether a
warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the
totality of the circumstances.").
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As noted by the State, trial counsel's objection prevented the magistrate from making
the inference that "the prosecutor would never have been able to reach the magistrate that
night because his phone ringer was off. By successfully objecting and moving to strike the
testimony, the magistrate was left with evaluating simply the fact the prosecutor called three to
five times over 10 minutes and then stopped trying." Respondent's Brief at 19.
Trial counsel's decision falls within the wide range of professional assistance. The
on-call prosecutor's statement was arguably hearsay, and the magistrate ruled the statement
irrelevant. At the time of the suppression hearing there was no binding Idaho authority to the
effect that when an on-call magistrate is unavailable, the State has the burden of
demonstrating why that occurred and the burden of showing that good cause existed for the
unavailability.
The appellant seeks to find trial counsel ineffective on the basis of hindsight, which is
impermissible. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 791, 948 P.2d 127, 146 (1997)
("Under the Strickland two-part test, the claimant bears the burden of proving that counsel's
performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680, 104 S.Ct. at 2060-61. In this analysis,
counsel's effectiveness must be evaluated from the time of the alleged error, not in hindsight.
Id. at 681, 104 S.Ct. at 2061.").
Prior to the Idaho Supreme Court's statement in the suppression appeal there was no
authority that when a magistrate is unable to be reached by law enforcement, the State has
the burden of showing why that is the case and that good cause exists to excuse the
unavailability. That statement came in the direct appeal of this case. Trial counsel could not
have had knowledge of the statement at the time of the suppression hearing. Also, as noted
by the State, the appellant presented no evidence as to what the magistrate would have
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actually testified to concerning the reason he did not respond to the State's efforts to contact
him that evening.
While the U.S. Supreme Court in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1152
(2013), references the "procedures in place for obtaining a warrant or the availability of a
magistrate judge," as possible relevant factors, it says nothing concerning the reason why a
magistrate is unavailable as a relevant factor and does not specify or indicate that the State
would have the burden of explaining the magistrate's unavailability and have the burden to
demonstrate good cause to excuse the magistrate's unavailability. See McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at
1568 ("Although the Missouri Supreme Court referred to this case as 'unquestionably a routine
DWI case,' 358 S.W.3d, at 74, the fact that a particular drunk-driving stop is 'routine' in the
sense that it does not involve 'special facts,' ibid., such as the need for the police to attend to
a car accident, does not mean a warrant is required. Other factors present in an ordinary
traffic stop, such as the procedures in place for obtaining a warrant or the availability of a
magistrate judge, may affect whether the police can obtain a warrant in an expeditious way
and therefore may establish an exigency that permits a warrantless search. The relevant
factors in determining whether a warrantless search is reasonable, including the practical
problems of obtaining a warrant within a timeframe that still preserves the opportunity to
obtain reliable evidence, will no doubt vary depending upon the circumstances in the case.").
Trial counsel for the petitioner made a substantial effort to suppress evidence obtained
without a warrant. The argument he made that the unavailability of the magistrate was not
relevant in determining exigent circumstance may have been in error in light of the comment
made by the Idaho Supreme Court in Chernobieff, p. 541. But counsel could not foresee that
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it might be error to exclude an explanation of the Judge's unavailability in the absence of prior
authority to that effect.

VI. CONCLUSION
The magistrate's summary dismissal of the appellant's petition for post-conviction relief
is affirmed.
Dated this

'-3.

day of July 2019.

rict Judge
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